（英语语言文学专业论文）语用预设与理想交际语境的构建.pdf

descriptive chinese abstract i descriptive chinese abstract 人类话语交际是以人的认知为基础的， 预设在这一过程中不是涉及语句本身的一种 单纯的语言现象，而是说话人即言者言语建构过程的一个基础环节，是说话人的一种语 言认知活动。 从这一角度来研究预设可以更深入的了解话语交际过程中交际者语言认知 能力的运用过程及机制，从而进一步揭示人类语言思维的本质对预设的影响。语境的变 化会影响发话人的预设和受话人对该话语意义的理解。也就是说，一句话所引发的预设 制约着该句作为其前面话语之后续的恰当性； 一句话所引发的预设还制约着该句后面话 语的恰当性。预设在话语的信息结构中位于起始点，不断为语境引入新的信息，使语境 处于不断扩大的状态，从而使新的理想语境的构建成为可能。以往人们对预设的研究没 有从认知的角度去研究言者意图与语境的关系， 忽略了通过预设说话人可以构建体现其 交际意图的理想交际语境这一可能性。 本论文在关联理论和顺应论理论框架内探讨了预设、交际意图与话语意义的关系， 目的是研究语用预设在言语交际中对构建理想语境所起的作用, 以及在有效交际中说 话人是如何对语用预设进行运作的。 在现有对预设和语境的研究成果上提出了构建理想 交际语境这一设想， 根据语用预设的特性以及语用预设与语境的关系分析了构建理想交 际语境的可行性; 从说话人对语境的操控和听话人对语境的延伸和选择方面，详细论述 了认知语境对交际意图的语用制约和推理功能并指出虚假语用预设可以积极体现说话 人意图，构建体现说话人意图的理想语境可达到幽默、劝说、逃避责任、缓和气氛等有 效交际目的。本论文基于这样一种假设：语用预设在言语交际的信息流中起着一种衔接 作用；语用预设的运用有利于创造理想交际语境并达到交际顺畅的目的。 本文在引言部分简要回顾了本论题的研究现状、 目前对此研究中存在的不足以及本 论文研究的重点、研究方法和文章结构。第二章简要回顾了预设产生的哲学基础、语义 预设和语用预设的概念、 语用预设中常用的四种理论以及本篇论文中要涉及到的相关语 用预设的特征。本文第三章讨论了“语境”及“理想交际语境”的概念、功能；同时探 讨了构建理想交际语境的可行性。在第四章，本文重点探讨了说话人意图与理想交际语 境的构建以及说话人交际意图体现的一项常用操作手段虚假语用预设。 第五章主要 讨论了说话者在话语建构中如何根据共有知识，适切性原则等对语境进行选择，通过对 预设信息进行取消来操控语用预设。第六部分是论文的结论，总结了本论文的主要研究 内容，创新点并提出了有待进一步研究的内容设想。本论文主要从发话人的角度研究了 descriptive chinese abstract ii 对预设的运用，因此可以从受话人的角度进一步研究对预设的理解和推理；另外，还可 以从认知的角度对预设展开进一步研究。 关键词：关键词：语用预设，言者意图，虚假语用预设，理想交际语境 english abstract iii abstract due to the cognitive basis of human verbal communication presupposition in communication in this sense is no longer a kind of language phenomenon which concerns the utterance itself but a basic step of the speakers utterance construction which works as a kind of human cognition. studying presupposition from this cognitive aspect can let linguists know more about the working processes of the communicators cognition and the models of human language cognitive ability. the changing of contexts directly influences the interpreting of utterance. that is to say, the presupposition evoked by a given sentence constrains its own appropriateness as a possible continuation of the other sentences preceding it in the discourse; the presupposition evoked by a given sentence also constrains the appropriateness of the other following sentences. presupposition serves as the departing point for the structuring of information in discourse and continuously introduces new information into the context. hence, presupposition keeps the context enlarging in the course of communication so that the continuous construction of optimal contexts is possible. the previous study on presupposition has never illustrated how a speakers intention and certain contexts interact from the perspective of cognition. they neglect the feasibility that by means of presupposition, taking both the speakers and the hearers cognitive environment into consideration, the speaker can construct a certain optimal communicative context to achieve his goal. the study of the relation between presupposition, the speakers communicative intention and the utterance meaning will be carried out under the theoretical framework of relevance and adaptation. therefore, the objective of this thesis has been to study the role of pragmatic presupposition in the process of constructing optimal contexts for communication as well as the addressers manipulation of pragmatic presupposition in effective communication. on the basis of the previous study and theories of presupposition and context, the author puts forward the concept of optimal communicative context and analyzes the feasibility of its construction after having a further analysis of the features of presupposition and the interaction between context and presupposition. the cognitive contexts function of pragmatic constrain and cognitive inference of communicative intention are centered on since either the speaker can control the communicative context to make an utterance or the hearer can select a context to interpret the speakers intention according to their cognitive environment. the author also english abstract iv points out that by means of sham pragmatic presupposition, the speakers communicative intention can be positively involved and gain some special communicative effects as being humorous, persuasive, shirking certain responsibility or creating harmonious atmosphere. the hypothesis of the thesis is that pragmatic presupposition serves as a link in the flow of information in verbal communication and the manipulation of pragmatic presupposition contributes to the generation of contexts and the coherence of the communication. the whole thesis is composed of five chapters and a conclusion. the author has a literature review of presupposition and the study of presupposition in context construction first. then she points out the limitation of previous study in this field and proposes an integrated study of presupposition and context. in chapter two the philosophical origin of presupposition is generalized first and presupposition is analyzed from the semantic perspective and the pragmatic perspective. then, four theories used to explain pragmatic presupposition are introduced. she thinks that pragmatic presupposition bears some features which make it possible to create new and optimal context for further communication. chapter three is about a survey of context. in this chapter there is a general view of context, followed by sperber but it does not follow that the sense of the sentence kepler died in misery contains the thought that the name kepler designates something. if this were the case the negation would have to run not kepler did not die in misery but kepler did not die in misery, or the name kepler has no reference (frege 1892 in geach and black, 1994: 159) thus according to frege, from sentence (1), we can infer sentence (2). (1) kepler died in misery. (2) there was a man called kepler. this kind of inference is not part of the logical meaning of the sentence. sentence (1) does not tell us directly that (2) is the case. but (2) is the precondition for the use of (1). without the existence of kepler, one cannot talk about his dying in misery or anything at all. one thing worth mentioning is that frege is the first to note that the same presupposition remains unchanged in the corresponding negative sentence. thus sentence (3) also presupposes (2). (3) kepler did not die in misery. the main point of freges analysis is that the condition that the name kepler has a referent is not part of the assertions of sentence (1) and (3). rather, it is the presupposition for chapter 2 presupposition 6 the assertion in question. the british philosopher bertrand russell, however, disagrees with freges distinction between what is presupposed and what is asserted. in his article on denoting of 1905, he proposes to analyze such proposition as (1) in a different way. according to him, the (a) propositions below are analyzed as the ones in (b). (4) a. the present king of france is bald. b. there is an x such that x is now king of france and x is bald. (5) a. kepler died in misery. b. there was an x such that x was called kepler and that x died in misery. in this way, the denoting phrases are broken up, analyzed away, or eliminated. they are no longer there in the resultant propositions. the original proposition is now seen as a conjunction of the new propositions. for example, (4) a is analyzed as a conjunction of the three propositions in (6): (6) a. there is a king of france. b. there is no one else who is king of france. c. the king of france is bald. russell holds the view that anyone saying (4) a in 1905, or today, would be asserting something that is false, given the fact that there was no king of france then, as there is not today. following his way of analyzing, sentence (7) a is ambiguous, for it can mean either (7) b or (7) c. in the first sense, (7) a is true, and in the second, it is false. (7) a. the present king of france is not bald. b. it is false that there is an entity which is now king of france and is bald. c. there is an entity which is now king of france and is not bald. this line of argument did not meet any criticism until about half a century later when peter strawson wrote on referring in 1950. strawson fiercely attacks russells theory and revives the concept of presupposition. when analyzing “the king of france is bald,” russell says part of its meaning is that there is a king of france. strawson (1952), however, dismisses this view as unquestionably wrong. he makes a distinction between 1) sentences chapter 2 presupposition 7 that contain an expression that can be used to refer to certain objects or individuals, and 2) purely existential sentences. in his view, when a sentence contains a definite description in subject position, the description is used to refer to a certain person or object; such a sentence falls in the first and not the second category; the corresponding existential sentences are presupposed and not asserted. strawson not only objects to russells obscuration of the distinction between assertion and presupposition, but also rises against the latters view on the truth value of a statement like (8) and (9). (8) the king of france is wise. (9) the king of france is bald. he argues that in response to such a statement, nobody would say “thats untrue.” if pressed for an opinion of its truth value, the listener would possibly say that she does not think it is true, or it is false. the question of whether the statement is true or false simply does not arise, because there is no such person as king of france. the statement has no truth value. the truth of the presuppositions of a sentence, therefore, is a condition for the possibility of making an assertion by means of that sentence. if some presupposition of a sentence is not true, that sentence cannot be used to make a statement, and cannot have a truth value. in the book introduction to logical theory published in 1952, strawson presents the following definition of presupposition: a statement s presupposes a statement s if and only if the truth of s is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of s. (van der sandt 1988: 7) we may notice that strawson does not make definite descriptions in subject position the sole possible source in defining presupposition. by his definition any statement that must be true for another statement to have a truth value is a presupposition of that statement (ibid: 8). this has led to the further study of a variety of linguistic devices that give rise to presuppositions. what is more important about this definition is that it has specified the status of presupposition as truth-conditional for its host sentence. this is exactly the base on which the semantic approach of presupposition is later on established. on the other hand, though strawson makes no use of pragmatic notions in defining presupposition, yet on the chapter 2 presupposition 8 assumption that a speaker must make in principle verifiable statements, the definition predicts that an attempted assertion is infelicitous or inappropriate unless its presuppositions are satisfied, or on the assumption that a speaker must believe what he says (searles sincerity condition for assertion and grices maxim of quality), the definition predicts that it is incorrect for a speaker to utter a sentence unless he believes its presuppositions to be true. thus, strawsons view also opens the way for presupposition to come into pragmatics. in a word, strawsons theory acts as the thin end of a wedge, leading to a craze for the study of presupposition in the 1970s along with the flourishing literature from both a semantic and a pragmatic perspective. 2.2 semantic presupposition and pragmatic presupposition presupposition is, generally speaking, of two kinds: semantic presupposition and pragmatic presupposition. semantic presupposition is concerned with the relation between two sentences or propositions and truth-value assignment. for example: (10) catherine went to school yesterday. (11) catherine didnt go to school yesterday. (12) catherine exists. sentence (10) presupposes sentence (12). if we negate sentence (10), or, sentence (11), then its negation form still presupposes sentence (12). in other words, the presupposition of a sentence remains unchanged in its negation form. this property of constancy under negation is treated as a defining property of semantic presupposition. according to semantic presupposition, when sentence (12) is false, the other two sentences would be meaningless. in order to account for the case of a false presupposition, semantic conceptions of presupposition introduce either a notion of a third truth value or a notion of truth-value gap. that is to say, when the presupposition of a sentence is false, the sentence itself is neither true nor false. but in actual communication, it is possible to say sentence (11) even when sentence (12) is false. since this cannot be explained from the semantic perspective, pragmatic analysis becomes necessary. chapter 2 presupposition 9 pragmatic presupposition usually refers to propositions whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a linguistic expression and propositions without which the utterance cannot be properly interpreted. it is defined by different linguists with different focuses and in different dictions: presupposition is treated as inferences about what is assumed to be true in the utterance rather than directly asserted to be true (peccei, 2000: 19). presuppositions are aspects of meaning that must be presupposed, understood, taken for granted for an utterance to make sense (verschueren, 2000: 27). pragmatic presuppositions are best described as a relation between a speaker and the appropriateness of a sentence in a context (levinson, 1997: 177). a presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions (yule, 1996: 25). however, all these definitions agree that there are considerable differences between semantic presupposition and pragmatic presupposition. in other words, pragmatic presupposition is closely connected with the utterance whereas semantic presupposition is associated with the sentence or the proposition of the sentence. in brief, from the pragmatic perspective, speakers have presuppositions; from the semantic perspective, presupposition is part of the meaning of the sentence. 2.3 theories used to explain pragmatic presupposition presupposition is a complex language phenomenon which is difficult to describe and explain that the studies on it are always variable both in scope and on degree. linguists have studied it from different aspects and they developed many theories to define and explain it. semantic studies on language are mainly about some principles to define and describe language phenomenon while pragmatic studies on language are mainly about some theories to be operated and explain language phenomena, as a result of which the basic theories used to explain presupposition are mainly pragmatic ones. chapter 2 presupposition 10 2.3.1 appropriateness appropriateness or felicity theory was first proposed by keenan. by appropriateness he refers to: an utterance a pragmatically presupposes a proposition b iff a is appropriate only b is mutually known by participants. (levinson, 1983: 205) this idea implicates that “there are pragmatic constraints on the uses of sentences such that they can only be appropriately used if it is assumed in the context that the propositions indicated by the presupposition triggers are true” (levinson, ibid: 205). therefore, uttering a sentence whose presuppositions are known to be false, would nearly mean to produce an inappropriate utterance rather than to have asserted a sentence that is neither true nor false. 2.3.2 common ground theory (mutual knowledge) common ground theory was proposed by stalnaker. he thinks that the common ground of a conversation at a particular time is the set of propositions that the participants in that conversation at that time mutually assume to be taken for granted and not subject to further discussion (stalnaker, 1973: 447-457). the common ground describes a set of worlds, the context set, which are those worlds in which all of the propositions in the common ground are true. the context set is the set of worlds that for all that is currently assumed to be taken for granted, could be the actual world. when uttered assertively, sentences are meant to update the common ground. if the sentence is accepted by the participants, the proposition it expresses is added to the common ground. the context set is updated by removing the worlds in which this proposition is false and by keeping the worlds in which the proposition is true. from then on, the truth of the sentence is part of the common ground, is mutually assumed to be taken for granted and is not subject to further discussion. one natural source of pragmatic presuppositions may be semantic presuppositions associated with the sentence: conditions that need to be satisfied for the sentence to have a determinate semantic value. stalnaker (ibid: 447-457) assumes that a sentence can not be chapter 2 presupposition 11 used to update a common ground unless it has a determinate semantic value in all of the worlds in the context described by that common ground. if a speaker asserts such a sentence and intends for it to successfully do its jobs of updating the common ground, that speaker can do so only if he assumes that the semantic presuppositions of the sentence are entailed by the common ground. according to stalnakers theory presupposition is not a relation between propositions and sentences but a relation between propositions and human beings. this, in fact, just means that pre