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OwnershipandcontrolrightsinInternetportalalliances 1995 1999 DanielW ElfenbeinJoshLerner PresentedbyYangJuzhengGuanghuaSchoolofManagement PekingUniversity RANDJournalofEconomics Vol 34 2003 ModernTheoryoftheFirm BackgroundIntroduction TheoryofIncompleteContracts TheoryofIncompleteContractsBoundariesoforganizations Hart1995 Organizationofactivitieswithinafirm Aghion Tirole1997 Designofrelationshipsbetweenfirms Hart Moore1999 Modelswearegoingtotest StandardGrossman Hart MoorePropertyRightsFramework assetsinabilateralrelationshipshouldbeownedbythepartywhosemarginalefforthasthegreatestimpactonprojectsuccess Aghion Tirole sModelofContractingInnovations relativebargainingpowerisanimportantdeterminantoftheallocationofpropertyrights DataSelection Morethan100alliancecontractsbetweenInternetportalsandotherfirmsasincompletecontracts UnforeseencontingenciesCostofwritingcontractsCostofenforcingcontracts InternetasaturbulentanduncertainenvironmentAhighspeedofdevelopmentandchange MajorConclusions 1 2 Thedivisionofownershipdisplayedapatternconsistentwiththepredictionsoftheincompletecontractingliterature suchasGrossman Hart1986 Theownershipofcriticalelementssuchasthewebsiteaddressandthecustomerdatawastypicallyassignedtothepartywhoseeffortwasmostcriticaltothesuccessoftheagreement MajorConclusions 2 2 Theallocationofcontrolrightsappearedmostsensitivetothebargainingpowerofthetwocontractingparties Note controlrightsaresensitivetobargainingpower butownershipisnot ThisdivisionofcontrolwasconsistentwithAghion Tirole1994 Theoreticalliteraturesoftendon tmakeacleardistinctionbetweenthem Inportalagreements controlwasassignedinasomewhatdifferentmannerthanownership relativefinancialandproductmarketstrengthismostcritical Ownershipvs Control TheoreticalModel1 Contractsbecomeincompletewhenthere sactionsunobservableorunverifiablewhichinresultmakesthemunenforceable Grossman Hart Moore PropertyRightsApproach Exanteallocationofownership Expostgainsfromtrade BargainingPower IncentivetoInvest TheoreticalModel2 Exceptionsexistthatexanteallocationofownershipandspecifiedcontrolrightsmaynotmaximizeexpostsurplus oneofwhichisfromAghion Tirole1994 R DAlliancebetweenaresearchunitandacustomerLiquidityconstraintoftheresearchunitSuccessstemfromresearchunit seffortandcustomer sresourcesTwopolarcases exantebargainingpowerbelongsto 1 researchunitvs 2 customerOwnershipoftheresearchoutputwillbeefficientlyallocatedPossibleallocationfailurebecauseoftheliquidityconstraint PortalAlliances PortalsareInternetsitesthatprovide directlyorindirectly abroadarrayofserviceandlinkagestousers Classifiedcollectionsoflinkstootherwebsites Searchengines Contentandservices suchasstockprice news auctionsonlineande mailsetal PortalAlliance Win WinAlliance Directcompensationthatportalsreceiveforthead promotionsandotherservicestheyprovidetoalliancepartners Indirectbenefitfromthealliancesbyincreasingtheappealoftheportal ssitebydeepeningitscontentandextendingitsfeatures Allianceswerealsousefulforthepartnerfirms whethertheywerecontent serviceortechproviders Portalallianceswereonemethodofattractingusersandalsoenabledthepartnertoacquirecustomerdata etal IncompleteContracts Bothparties effortdecisionswerelikelytoimpactthevalueofthealliancesandmanyoftheseeffortdecisionswerenon contractible e g Portals ongoingeffortstoupgradeandexpandtheirsitescouldchangethevalueforthepartner e g Incontentagreements partnerfirmscontrolledthefrequencyandqualityofupdatesthatmattermuch Inmanyalliancesbothpartieshadopportunitiestobehaveopportunisticallyincompetingforcustomers Assetownershiplikelyprovidedimportantincentivestothecontractingparties TypicalOwnershipofaportal URL UniformResourceLocator ServerUserInformationDatabaseTheownershiparrangementdeterminethatifthealliancebrokedown whatcouldtheownercontinuetoget What smore Inadditiontoassetownership whichprovidesresidualcontrolrights specifiedcontrolrightsareexaminedintheanalysis Tworeason Specifiedcontrolrightsareimportantinthedesignofportalalliances Specifiedcontrolrightsnarrowthescopeofresidualcontrolrights DataSet 106contractsbetweenportalsandotherfirmsenteredintobetween1995 1999 primarilyfromRecap ITSupplementalfinancialinfowasfromCompustatandWorldscopeContractingparties webtraffic suchasthereachofthewebsites thenumberofdayspervisitorpermonth etal fromMediaMatrix DistributionofObsbyYear EffortRequiredbyTwoParties Wecodeas 1iftheportalwasrequiredtomakethegreatereffort 1ifthepartner TrafficonInternetProperties FinancialPositionofP P Analysis WearegoingtotestthepredictionsofthepropertyrightstheoryandA T1994theorybyexaminingtherelationship ofthetwoparties Contractualallocationofeffort ownership control Financialandproductmarketstrength IndependentVariables ThedateoftheagreementTherelativeeffortrequiredofthetwopartiesTherelativetrafficonthetwoparties internetsites sites reach Therelativefinancialstrengthofthecontractingparties revenues RelativeBargainingPower TestingOwnership Respectivelythreedependentvariables URLs serversandcustomerdataasassetsSeeminglyUnrelatedRegression SUR employinganorderedlogitspecification SURanalysisofindividualownershipprovisionsinportalalliancesusinganorderedlogitspecification SURanalysisofindividualownershipprovisionsinportalalliancesusinganorderedlogitspecification Ownershipdidnotdisplayasignificantpatternacrosstime nordiditdisplayaconsistentrelationshipwiththerelativetrafficorrevenuesofthetwoparties Assetownershipwashighlysensitivetowhoprovidedthegreatesteffortinthealliance Grossman HartPropertyRightsTheory TestingControl 12majoraspectsofthegovernanceoftheagreementsareidentifiedthatwerecommontothesetofagreementsweanalyzed Inthiscase aSURusinganorderedlogitspecificationcouldnotberunusingalltwelvecontrolprovisionssimultaneously becausetheindependentvariablesinsomeregressionsperfectlypredictedsomeofthedependentvariables Instead Table3displaystheresultsofaSURusingalinearprobabilitymodel Seeminglyunrelatedregressionanalysesoftheindividualcontrolinportalalliances ResultoftheRegression Intheseregressions thecoefficientsontheyearoftheagreementarejointlysignificantatthep 05level halfoftheobservedcoefficientsarepositiveandhalfarenegative however soitisdifficulttodrawanyoverallconclusionabouthowthetimingofthecontractmighthaveaffectedthea
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