关联交易下的盈余管理

外文文献翻译EarningsManagementthroughAffiliatedTransactionsPriorresearchhasprimarilytestedforearningsmanagementunderthepremisethatthediscretionallowedinrecordingaccrualsgivesrisetoearningsmanagementbehavior(HealyandWahlen1999).Thesestudieshavefoundevidenceconsistentwithmanagersusingdiscretionaryaccrualstoreportearningsinaccordancewithcertainmanagerialincentives(e.g.,avoidlosses,maintainanearningstrend,meetanalysts'forecasts,maximizebonuses,avoiddebtcovenants,minimizepoliticalcosts,increaseofferingprice,etc.).'Weextendpriorresearchbyfocusingonanadditionalsourceofearningsmanagement.Besidesaccrualmanipulations,firmsmayalsoengageinearningsmanagementthroughtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Thatis,insteadofrelyingonthejudgmentaffordedbygenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciplesinrecordingaccruals,adominantcompanymayuseitsinfluentialrelationshipoveranaffiliatedcompanytostructuretransactionsbetweenthetwocompaniesinawaythatallowsprofitstobeshiftedfromtheaffiliatetothedominantcompany.Thedominantcompanyreportshigherprofitsandtheaffiliatereportslowerprofits,whiletheprofitabilityoftheeconomicentityasawholeremainsunaffected.Sincethevalueofthedominantcompanyisdirectlylinkedtotheprofitabilityandwellbeingoftheentireeconomicentity,thistypeofearningsmanagementmaycauseusersofthedominantcompany'sfinancialstatementstobemisled.Thereareseveralpotentialwaysthatcompaniescouldmanageearningsusingtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Firmsmayengageinchannelstuffingbyforcingdistributorstopurchasehigherthannormalinventorylevels,thusincreasingthemanufacturer'ssalesandprofitsforthecurrentperiod.Firmscouldalsomanageearningsusingtransactionswithlessthanwhollyownedsubsidiaries.Supposeaparentcompanysellsinventorytoalessthanwhollyownedsubsidiary,whichthensellstheinventorytoanexternalpartyinthesameperiod.Theincreaseinconsolidatedearningsoccursbecauselowerprofitsareshiftedtominorityshareholders.Firmsmayalsomanageearningsusingaffiliatedtransactionsbyeithershiftingprofitsacrossdifferenttaxjurisdictions(EmshwillerandSmith2002),orusinginfluenceoversuppliers(Butters2001).Dataontheeffectsofaffiliatedtransactions,becauseoftheirverynature,aredifficulttoobtain.Transactionsbetweentheparentcompanyandaffiliatescanaffecttheindividualearningsofthecompanieswithinthegroup,butconsolidatedearningsremaingenerallyunaffected.Forexample,theparentcompanycansellassets(e.g.,inventory,land,etc.)toitssubsidiary.Theamountofthesale,aswellasthetimingofthesale,canbeinfluencedbytheparentduetoitsdominantpositionoverthesubsidiary.Theparentcompanycanreportthesaleandincreasedearningsinthecurrentperiod.Forconsolidatedpurposes,theaffiliatedtransactionwillbeeliminatedandnotaffectthefinancialstatements.Theparentcompanycouldalsoenhanceitsearningsbyshiftingadditionaloperatingcoststosubsidiaries.Totaloperatingcostswouldbeincludedintheconsolidatedreportsbutnotintheparent's.Theparent'ssignificantinfluenceoverthesubsidiary'sdividendpolicyrepresentsanothermethodbywhichtheparentcompanycouldimproveparentearningswithnocorrespondingaffecttoconsolidatedearnings.Subsidiary-to-parentdividendsincreaseparentearningsunderthecostmethod,buttheseareexcludedfromconsolidatedearnings.TheJapanesereportingenvironmentallowsforapurematch(i.e.,samecompany)betweenparentandconsolidatedearnings.Foreachcompany,wecancompareearningsmanagementforstand-aloneparentearningsplusaffiliatedtransactionstoearningsmanagementforconsolidatedearningsexcludingaffiliatedtransactions.ConsistentwithpriorresearchbasedonU.S.firms(e.g.,BurgstahlerandDichev1997;Degeorgeetal.1999;PayneandRobb2000;Beattyetal.2002;Beaveretal.2003),bothparentandconsolidatedearningsinJapanaremanagedatthreeimportantearningsthresholds:avoidinglosses,avoidingearningsdeclines,andavoidingnegativeforecasterrors.Consistentwithexpectationsbasedontheabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions,parentearningsshowgreaterevidenceofearningsmanagementthandoconsolidatedearningsateachofthesethreeearningsthresholds.Additionaltestsindicatethattheincreasedmanagementofparentearningsaroundthesethreeearningsthresholdsisassociatedwiththeabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions.Investorsandotherfinancialstatementusersshouldbeawarethat,inadditiontotheuseofdiscretionaryaccruals,firmsmayalsomanageearningsusingtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Priorresearchhasfocusedalmostexclusivelyonearningsmanagementusingaccruals.Thisstudybringsattentiontoanadditionalsourceofearningsmanagement:affiliatedtransactions.Theabilityofcompaniestomanageearningsinthismannerislargelyunexploredintheliterature.WhileweaddressthisissueinaJapanesesettingbetweenparentandconsolidatedearnings,animportantquestionforfutureresearchis:"Towhatextentdogenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciplesinothercountriesallowfirmstousespecificaffiliatedtransactions(e.g.,channelstuffing,transactionswithlessthanwhollyownedsubsidiaries,shiftingprofitsacrosstaxjurisdictions,specialpurposeentities,influentialrelationsoversuppliers,etc.)tomanagereportedearnings?"ThistypeofearningsmanagementisnotrestrictedtoJapan,andlikelyoccursinmanyotherjurisdictionsaswell.Sincefirmvalueisdirectlyrelatedtothevalueoftheentireeconomicentity,understandinghowcompaniesenhancetheirreportedperformancebyshiftingprofitswithintheeconomicentityisimportanttousersoffinancialstatementsaroundtheworld.Inexaminingwhethermanagersengageinparentearningsmanagement,itisusefulfirsttoconsiderwhetherearningsmanagementthroughaffiliatedtransactionscangoundetected.Ifinvestorsandotherfinancialstatementusersareabletoundothemanagementeffectsofaffiliatedtransactionsinparentearningsusinginformationinconsolidatedearnings,thenincentivestomanageparentearnings,discussedlaterinthissection,areweakened.However,intheJapanesebusinessandreportingenvironment,itisunlikelythatinvestorsandotherswhocontractwiththefirmwillbeabletoeasilydetectearningsmanagementusingaffiliatedtransactions.Intheparentreports,theprofitabilityoftransactionswiththirdpartiesandtransactionswithaffiliatesarenotseparatelydisclosed.Likewise,intheconsolidatedreports,theprofitabilityoftheparentcompany'sthird-partytransactionsisnotseparatelyreportedfromtheprofitabilityoftheaffiliatedcompanies'third-partytransactions.Informationontheprofitabilityofindividualaffiliatedcompaniesmaybeunavailableiftheaffiliatedcompanyiswhollyownedornotpubliclytraded.Affiliatesmayalsohavesubsidiariesorequityinvestments,furthercomplicatingtheassignmentofprofitability.ThecorporategroupinJapanconsistsofacomplexwebofinterlockingownership,andmultiplecross-holdingsthroughsubsidiariesarecommon.Thistypeofcorporatestructure,combinedwithalackofdetaileddisclosure,makesitdifficultforfinancialstatementsuserstodeterminetheextenttowhichparentearningsareaffectedbyaffiliatedtransactions.Becauseoftheundisclosednatureofaffiliatedtransactions,wecannotdirectlycomputetheextentofaffiliatedtransactions.Infact,thelackofdisclosureonstand-aloneparentorsubsidiaryearningsmakesaffiliatedtransactionsapotentiallyusefulearningsmanagementtechnique.Duetoitsambiguousmeaning,thefirm-specificdifferencebetweenconsolidatedearningsandparentearningsisnotusedforanyofourtests.Instead,wecomparethedistributionofparentearningstothedistributionofconsolidatedearningsasameanstodetectearningsmanagement.Asdiscussedinmoredetailbelow,weexpectthedistributionofparentearningstorevealmoreevidenceofearningsmanagementthanwillthedistributionofconsolidatedearningsaroundimportantearningsthresholds,dueatleastinparttotheavailabilityofaffiliatedtransactionstomanageparentearnings.Oursampleincludesbothparentandconsolidatedearningsforeachfirmtohelpcontrolfordifferencesinfirmcharacteristicswhencomparingthedistributions.Investorsalsoseemtocareaboutparentearnings,eventhoughconsolidatedearningsarereported.Halletal.(1994)reportthatstockreturnshaveasimilarorstrongerrelationwithparentearningsthantheydowithconsolidatedearnings.Thisresultconflictswiththenotionthatinvestorsconsiderconsolidatedearningstobeamorecompletemeasureofvalue.Herrmannetal.(2001)findthatJapaneseinvestorsfixateonparentearningsanddonotcorrectlyconsidertheimpactthatconsolidatedearningshaveonfirmvalue.Ifmanagersareawareofinvestors'fixationonparentearnings,thenmanagersmayhavestock-basedincentivestomeetinvestors'expectationsofparentearnings.TheincrementalimportanceofparentearningsinJapanisfurtherevidentinfinancialanalysts'forecasts.Financialanalystsprovideforecastsofbothparentandconsolidatedearnings,indicatingthatinvestorsdemandtheadditionalinformationfoundinparentearnings.DarroughandHarris(1991)examinewhetherforecastsofparentcompanyandconsolidatedearningsinJapanconveyinformationtoinvestors.Theyfindagreaterassociationofunexpectedsecurityreturnsandunexpectedearningsbasedonparentforecaststhanconsolidatedforecasts.InprivateconversationswithI/B/E/Spersonnel,weweretoldthattheI/B/E/Sdatabase,whilecollectingdataonbothparentandconsolidatedearningsforecasts,providesforecastdatafortheearningsnumber(parentorconsolidated)thatismorefrequentlyforecastedbyanalysts.Forfirmsthatreportbothparentandconsolidatedearningsduringthe1994-2000period,wefindatotalof50,677analyst/firm/yearforecastsforparentearningsand37,241analyst/firm/yearforecastforconsolidatedearnings.Thepriorityanalystsgivetoforecastingparentearningscreatesanadditionalincentiveformanagerstoreportparentearningsconsistentwithearningstargets,regardlessoftheamountreportedforconsolidatedearnings.Whileeachofthesevariablespotentiallyprovidesanoisymeasure,allofthemshouldcorrelatewiththefirm'sabilitytomanageparentearningsthroughtheuseofaffiliatedtransactions.Usingmultiplemeasuresincreasestheconfidenceintheresultsbynotover-relyingontheoutcomeofasinglevariable.Also,agreementinresultsacrossthethreevariablesprovidesadditionalassurancethatthevariablesapproximatetheconstructofinterest,thefirm'sabilitytomanageparentearningsusingaffiliatedtransactions.Priorresearchclearlydocumentsearningsmanagementthroughtheuseofdiscretionaryaccruals.Weextendtheliteraturebyinvestigatinganadditionalsourceofearningsmanagementtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Companiescanuseavarietyofaffiliatedtransactionstomanageearnings(e.g.,channelstuffing,transactionswithlessthanwhollyownedsubsidiaries,shiftingprofitsacrosstaxjurisdictions,specialpurposeentities,influentialrelationsoversuppliers,etc.)Toprovidealargecross-sectionaltestofearningsmanagementusingaffiliatedtransactions,weemployasampleofJapanesefirms.UnderJapaneseGAAP,parentearningsincludetheeffectsofaffiliatedtransactionswhileconsolidatedearningsexcludetheeffectsofaffiliatedtransactions.Weobserveearningsmanagementbehavioraroundthreeearningsthresholdsforbothparentandconsolidatedearnings:avoidinglosses,avoidingearningsdeclines,andavoidingnegativeforecasterrors.Consistentwithexpectationsbasedontransactionswithaffiliates,thedistributionsforparentearningsshowsubstantiallymoreevidenceofearningsbeingmanagedatthesethresholds.Thepercentageoffirmsthatmeetorexceedthethresholdforparentperformanceandmissthethresholdforconsolidatedperformanceisnoticeablyhigherthanthepercentageoffirmsthatmeetorexceedthethresholdforconsolidatedperformanceandmissitforparentperformance.Additionaltestsindicatethatearningsmanagementaroundthesethreeearningsthresholdsisassociatedwiththeabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactionsforparentearnings,butnotforconsolidatedearnings.Usersofparentfinancialstatementsingeneral,andJapanesefinancialstatementsinparticular,needtobeawarethatparentearningsbasedonthecostmethodforaffiliatesarelikelymanagedtoagreaterdegreethanareconsolidatedearningsduetotheimpactofaffiliatedtransactions.Futureresearchcanextendtheresultsofthisstudytounderstandhowfinancialreportingstandardsinothercountriesallowcompaniestomanageearningsusingtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Consistentwithadditionalearningsmanagementthroughaffiliatedtransactions,parentearningsshowstrongerevidenceofearningsmanagementthanconsolidatedearningsateachofthesethreeearningsthresholds.Furthertestsindicatethattheincreasedmanagementofparentearningsaroundthesethreeearningsthresholdsisrelatedtothefirm'sabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions,whilethemanagementofconsolidatedearningsisunrelatedtothefirm'sabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions.Finally,socialdisappointmentformanagersmaybegreaterwhenparentearningsgoalsarenotmetbecausethefailurecanbereliablyassignedtothemanagementteam.SinceJapanesemanagershavemorecontrolovertheoperationsoftheparentcompanythantheydoovertheconsolidatedentity,theymayfeelagreaterresponsibilitytomeettheincome-reportingobjectivesoftheparentcompany.Conversely,whentheconsolidatedcompanyfailstomeetearningsgoals,responsibilitycanmoreeasilybeshiftedtoothercompaniesorcircumstances.Therefore,eventhoughconsolidatedearningsarereported,managersmayevaluatethemselvesandbeevaluatedbyothersinthesocietybasedmoreonparentperformance.Resource:WayneB.Thomas,DonaldR.Herrmann,andTatsuoInoue.EarningmanagementthroughAffiliatedTransactions.JournalofInternationalAccountingResearch,2004:P1-25.译文：关联交易下的盈余管理先前的研究主要探测在谨慎性原则下，管理部门允许发生盈余管理行为（希利和瓦列1999）。这些研究已经发现了管理者基于某种管理动机，用自由决定的收益报告盈余的证据（例如，避免损失，维持一种盈利趋势，满足分析师的预期,最大限度的奖金,避免债务契约，减少政治成本、提高提供价格等）。我们扩大了先前的研究，着眼于盈余管理的其他来源。除了利息操纵，企业或许也会通过关联交易进行盈余管理。也就是说，不是依靠一般公认会计原则的判断，母公司可以使用它的影响关系，在两家公司构造关联交易，允许利润从子公司转移到母公司。母公司报告较高的利润，子公司报告较低的利润，而经济实体的盈利能力保持不受影响。因为母公司的价值与盈利能力、经济实体的定位有直接联系，这种类型的盈余管理会引起母公司财务报表使用者的误解。通过关联方交易，公司有几个潜在方法进行盈余管理。公司也许会通过强制分享者购买高于正常库存水平的东西，从而增加当期制造商的销售和利润。公司也可以使用交易对那些非全资子公司进行盈余管理。假如母公司把产品库存出售到非全资子公司，然后在同期将库存销售给外部企业。合并收入的增加是由于低利润都转移到了少数股东。公司也可能通过关联交易进行盈余管理，比如通过将不同的税收管辖权的利润加以转化（哈姆斯韦勒和史密斯2002），或者通过供应商的影响（巴特斯2001）。对关联交易影响的数据，因为其本质特性，所以很难获得。母子公司之间达成的交易会影响公司这个团体的利益，然而合并收入水平不受影响。例如，母公司可以出售资产（如：库存、土地等）给其全资子公司。由于母公司较其全资子公司占优势地位，因此子公司的销售数量和销售时间会受影响。母公司可以在当期报告销售和增加盈余。为了达到合并的目的，关联方交易会被消除，但不影响财务报表。母公司还可通过将额外的营运成本转移到子公司来提高其盈余。全部营运成本都将被收录在汇总报告，而不是在母公司的报告。母公司对子公司股利政策的显著影响代表了另一种方法，这种方法可以提高母公司的收入，而不相应地影响合并收入。子公司对母公司的股利在成本法下增加了母公司的收入，但不包括在合并收入中。日本曾经允许一个纯粹的比赛（例如，一个公司），在母公司收入和合并收入之间。对于每家公司，我们可以比较独立母公司通过关联方交易的盈余管理和不通过关联方交易的盈余管理。与基于美国公司的先前研究相一致（例如，伯格斯托勒和迪砌茀1997；迪格瑞格1999；佩恩和罗柏2000；比特2002；比茀2003），在日本母公司收入和合并收入被赋予三个重要的盈余管理目标：避免损失，避免收益减少，避免消极的预测误差。符合基于能力来进行关联交易的期望，母公司收入在盈余管理方面提供了比合并收入更多的证据。额外的测试表明，围绕这三个盈利目的对母公司收入增加管理，与使用关联交易的能力有关。投资者及其他财务报表使用者应该知道，除了使用审计师变更，企业也可以通过关联方交易进行盈余管理。之前的研究已经基本上集中在利用应计利润来盈余管理。本研究使人关注盈余管理的另一来源：关联方交易。公司用这种方式盈余管理的能力是在文字里探索不到的。当我们解决关于母公司收入和合并收入这一问题，未来研究的一个重要问题是：在多大程度上其他国家接受一般公认会计原则并允许公司使用特别的关联交易（例如填塞分销渠道，与非全资子公司交易，在税收管辖权上转换利润，特殊目的的存在，供应商间有影响的关系等）来管理报告出来的收益？这种类型的盈余管理是不受限制于日本，而且在许多其他司法管辖区都有可能会出现。因为公司的价值与整个经济实体的价值直接相关，了解公司如何用经济实体转换利润来提高报告的性能，对世界各地财务报表的使用者来说是很重要的。审查管理者是否从事母公司盈余管理，先考虑利用关联交易进行盈余管理是否会被对方发现是很有用的。如果投资者及其他财务报表使用者能够解开关联交易于母公司收入与合并收入的管理效果，然后鼓励管理母公司收入，后在这段时间中讨论，那么利用关联方交易进行盈余管理的行为就会被削弱。然而，在日本商业和报告环境中，它是不可能的，投资者和