公司理财16 资本结构：债务运用的限制ppt课件.ppt

第16章资本结构：债务运用的限制,16.1财务困境成本16.2成本的种类16.3能够降低债务成本吗？16.4税收和财务困境成本的综合影响16.5怠工、在职消费与有害投资16.6优序融资理论16.7增长和负债比16.8个人税16.9公司如何确定资本结构16.10小结,16.1财务困境成本CostsofFinancialDistress,破产风险或破产成本Bankruptcyriskversusbankruptcycost.例：某公司预测未来的现金流量为100美元或50美元，发生的概率均为50%.公司没有其他资产，需要支付的利息为60美元。不考虑税收。假设：（1）债权人和股东是风险中立者；（2）利率（贴现率）为10%.试评估公司的价值。,单位：美元,以上忽略了破产费用，实际情况可能是：,单位：美元,公司价值现在是61.36元，低于前面计算的68.18元。,结论：破产的可能性对公司价值有负面影响Thepossibilityofbankruptcyhasanegativeeffectonthevalueofthefirm.然而，并不是破产风险本身降低了公司价值However,itisnottheriskofbankruptcyitselfthatlowersvalue.而是与破产密切相关的成本降低了公司价值Ratheritisthecostsassociatedwithbankruptcy.股东承担了这些风险。破产成本损害了股东的利益。Itisthestockholderswhobearthesecosts.,16.2成本的种类DescriptionofCosts,财务困境的直接成本DirectCosts清算和重组的法律成本和管理成本Legalandadministrativecosts(tendtobeasmallpercentageoffirmvalue).在破产和破产前期的所有阶段，自始自终都有律师的介入参与。费用通常是每小时几百美元计，而且快递增加。已有大量的学术研究在探讨如何衡量财务困境的直接成本。White、Altman和Weiss估计财务困境的直接成本大概是公司市值的3%,财务困境的间接成本IndirectCosts经营受到影响Impairedabilitytoconductbusiness(e.g.,lostsales)代理成本AgencyCostsSelfishstrategy1:冒高风险的动机IncentivetotakelargerisksSelfishstrategy2:投资不足的动机IncentivetowardunderinvestmentSelfishStrategy3:撇脂Milkingtheproperty,例：BalanceSheetforaCompanyinDistress,AssetsBVMVLiabilitiesBVMVCash$200$200LTbonds$300FixedAsset$400$0Equity$300Total$600$200Total$600$200Whathappensifthefirmisliquidated（清算）today?,Thebondholdersget$200;theshareholdersgetnothing.,$200,$0,bookvalue,maketvalue,SelfishStrategy1:TakeLargeRisks投资高风险项目,TheGambleProbabilityPayoffWinBig10%$1,000LoseBig90%$0Costofinvestmentis$200(allthefirmscash)Requiredreturnis50%ExpectedCFfromtheGamble=$10000.10+$0=$100,SelfishStockholdersAcceptNegativeNPVProjectwithLargeRisks,ExpectedCFfromtheGambleToBondholders=$3000.10+$0=$30ToStockholders=($1000-$300)0.10+$0=$70PVofBondsWithouttheGamble=$200PVofStocksWithouttheGamble=$0PVofBondsWiththeGamble=$30/1.5=$20PVofStocksWiththeGamble=$70/1.5=$47,负债,SelfishStrategy2:Underinvestment投资不足,Consideragovernment-sponsoredprojectthatguarantees$350inoneperiodCostofinvestmentis$300(thefirmonlyhas$200now)sothestockholderswillhavetosupplyanadditional$100tofinancetheprojectRequiredreturnis10%,Shouldweacceptorreject?,SelfishStockholdersForegoPositiveNPVProject,ExpectedCFfromthegovernmentsponsoredproject:ToBondholder=$300ToStockholder=($350-$300)=$50PVofBondsWithouttheProject=$200PVofStocksWithouttheProject=$0PVofBondsWiththeProject=$300/1.1=$272.73PVofStockswiththeproject=$50/1.1-$100=-$54.55,自筹的100元,SelfishStrategy3:MilkingtheProperty撇脂,清算股利LiquidatingdividendsSupposeourfirmpaidouta$200dividendtotheshareholders.Thisleavesthefirminsolvent（破产）,withnothingforthebondholders,butplentyfortheformershareholders.Suchtacticsoftenviolatebondindentures.额外的津贴Increaseperquisitestoshareholdersand/ormanagement,利己策略总结：仅当有破产或财务困境的可能性时，才发生上述的扭曲策略。这些扭曲策略不应影响象通用电气这样多元化经营的一流公司。由谁来支付利己投资策略的成本？最终由股东承担。因为，如果债权人知道危机逼近时，会要求提高债券利率保护自己。由于股东要负担这些利率，他们最终要负担利己的成本。因此，面临这些扭曲策略的公司难以获得债务且代价高昂，它们会拥有较低的财务杠杆比率。,16.3能够降低债务成本吗？CanCostsofDebtBeReduced?,保护性条款ProtectiveCovenants债务的合并DebtConsolidation:Ifweminimizethenumberofparties,contractingcostsfall.,ProtectiveCovenants,Agreementstoprotectbondholders消极条款：你不能做：Negativecovenant:Thoushaltnot:支付超额股息Paydividendsbeyondspecifiedamount.发行更高级别的债券Sellmoreseniordebtasaresult,100%debtfinancingissub-optimal.高增长公司的负债比率将低于低增长公司Thus,high-growthfirmswillhavelowerdebtratiosthanlow-growthfirms.,16.8个人税PersonalTaxes:TheMillerModel,TheMillerModelshowsthatthevalueofaleveredfirmcanbeexpressedintermsofanunleveredfirmas:,Where:TS=personaltaxrateonequityincomeTB=personaltaxrateonbondincomeTC=corporatetaxrate,Thederivationisstraightforward:,Continued,Thefirsttermisthecashflowofanunleveredfirmafteralltaxes.Itsvalue=VU.,AbondisworthB.ItpromisestopayrBB(1-TB)aftertaxes.Thusthevalueofthesecondtermis:,Thetotalcashflowtoallstakeholdersintheleveredfirmis:,ThevalueofthesumofthesetwotermsmustbeVL,ThustheMillerModelshowsthatthevalueofaleveredfirmcanbeexpressedintermsofanunleveredfirmas:,InthecasewhereTB=TS,wereturntoMthisisconsistent（一致）withM&Mwithtaxes.Anotherinterpretationisthatfirmssignalgoodnewswhentheyleverup.不同行业的资本结构存在差异ThereareDifferencesinCapitalStructureAcrossIndustries.有证据表明一些公司有目标债务权益比率ThereisevidencethatfirmsbehaveasiftheyhadatargetDebttoEquityratio.,影响目标负债权益的因素FactorsinTargetD/ERatio,税收TaxesIfcorporatetaxratesarehigherthanbondholdertaxrates,thereisanadvantagetodebt.资产类型TypesofAssetsThecostsoffinancialdistressdependonthetypesofassetsthefirmhas.比如土地的重置价值高于研发的重置价值经营收入的不确定性UncertaintyofOperatingIncomeEvenwithoutdebt,firmswithuncertainoperatingincomehavehighprobabilityofexperiencingfinancialdistress.优序融资和财务资源闲置PeckingOrderandFinancialSlackTheorystatingthatfirmsprefertoissuedebtratherthanequityifinternalfinanceisinsufficient.,16.10小结SummaryandConclusions,1.在上一章我们提到，根据理论，在资本征税之下，公司应建立完全债务的资本结构。由于在现实世界中公司一般采取适中的债务额。在本章我们指出财务困境成本导致公司限制其债务的发行。这些成本有两种类型：直接的和间接的。直接成本DirectcostsLawyersandaccountantsfees间接成本IndirectCosts削弱经营能力Impairedabilitytoconductbusiness投资高风险项目的动机Incentivestotakeonriskyprojects投资不足的动机Incentivestounderinvest撇脂Incentivetomilktheproperty,2.由于上述成本很大且最终由股东承担，公司有削减成本的动机。我们建议三种成本削减的技巧：Threetechniquestoreducethesecostsare:保护性条款Protectivecovenants先于破产前的债务回购Repurchaseofdebtpriortobankruptcy债务合并Consolidationofdebt3.因财务困境成本能被减少但不可被消除，公司不会全部用债务融资。公司选择使其价值最大化的负债-权益比。,Becausecostsoffinancialdistresscanbereducedbutnoteliminated,firmswillnotfinanceentirelywithdebt.,Debt(B),Valueoffirm(V),0,Presentvalueoftaxshieldondebt,Presentvalueoffinancialdistresscosts,ValueoffirmunderMMwithcorporatetaxesanddebt,VL=VU+TCB,V=Actualvalueoffirm,VU=Valueoffirmwithnodebt,B*,Maximumfirmvalue,Optimalamountofdebt,4.优序融资理论暗示了管理者偏好内部融资胜于外部融资.如果需要外部融资,管理者倾向于选择最安全的证券,如债务。5.迄今为止的结论忽略了个人税。如果给股东的分配以低于利息支付的实际个人税率纳税，在公司水平上的债务税收优惠被部分抵消。事实上，债务的公司税优惠被消除，如果：Ifdistributionstoequityholdersaretaxedatalowereffectivepersonaltaxratethaninterest,thetaxadvantagetodebtatthecorporatelevelispartiallyoffset（抵消）.Infact,thecorporateadvantagetodebtiseliminated（消除）if(1-TC)(1-T