中央财经大学《国际经济学》课件-lecture7

InternationalEconomicsILecture07TheInstrumentsofTradePolicy中央财经大学《国际经济学》Introduction1.BasicTariffAnalysis2.CostsandBenefitsofaTariff3.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy4.TheEffectsofTradePolicy:ASummarySummaryAppendixI:TariffAnalysisinGeneralEquilibriumAppendixII:TariffsandImportQuotasinthePresenceofMonopolyChapterOrganizationClassificationoftradePolicyInstrumentsIntroductiontradePolicyInstrumentsTradeContractionTradeExpansionTariffExporttaxImportquotaVoluntaryExportRestraint(VER)ImportsubsidyExportsubsidyVoluntaryImportExpansion(VIE)PriceQuantityPriceQuantity7.1.BasicTariffAnalysisATariffisataxthatisimposedbygovernmentonimportsorexports.Tariffscanbeclassifiedas:SpecifictariffsTaxesthatareleviedasafixedchargeforeachunitofgoodsimportedExample:Aspecifictariffof$10oneachimportedbicyclewithaninternationalpriceof$100meansthatcustomsofficialscollectthefixedsumof$10.AdvaloremtariffsTaxesthatareleviedasafractionofthevalueoftheimportedgoodsExample:A20%advaloremtariffonbicyclesgeneratesa$20paymentoneach$100importedbicycle.Acompoundduty(tariff)isacombinationofanadvaloremandaspecifictariff.

Moderngovernmentsusuallyprefertoprotectdomesticindustriesthroughavarietyofnontariffbarriers,suchas:ImportquotasLimitthequantityofimportsExportrestraintsLimitthequantityofexportsBasicTariffAnalysisSupply,Demand,andTradeinaSingleIndustrySupposethattherearetwocountries(HomeandForeign).Bothcountriesconsumeandproducewheat,whichcanbecostlesstransportedbetweenthecountries.Ineachcountry,wheatisacompetitiveindustry.SupposethatintheabsenceoftradethepriceofwheatatHomeexceedsthecorrespondingpriceatForeign.ThisimpliesthatshippersbegintomovewheatfromForeigntoHome.TheexportofwheatraisesitspriceinForeignandlowersitspriceinHomeuntiltheinitialdifferenceinpriceshasbeeneliminated.BasicTariffAnalysisTodeterminetheworldprice(Pw)andthequantitytrade(Qw),twocurvesaredefined:HomeimportdemandcurveShowsthemaximumquantityofimportstheHomecountrywouldliketoconsumeateachpriceoftheimportedgood.Thatis,theexcessofwhatHomeconsumersdemandoverwhatHomeproducerssupply:MD=D(P)–S(P)ForeignexportsupplycurveShowsthemaximumquantityofexportsForeignwouldliketoprovidetherestoftheworldateachprice.Thatis,theexcessofwhatForeignproducerssupplyoverwhatforeignconsumersdemand:XS=S*(P*)–D*(P*)BasicTariffAnalysisQuantity,QPrice,PPrice,PQuantity,QMDDSAPAP2P1S2D2D2–S22S1D1D1–S11Figure7-1:DerivingHome’sImportDemandCurveBasicTariffAnalysisMD1=D1-S1MD2=D2-S2Propertiesoftheimportdemandcurve:Itintersectstheverticalaxisattheclosedeconomypriceoftheimportingcountry.Itisdownwardsloping.Itisflatterthanthedomesticdemandcurveintheimportingcountry.BasicTariffAnalysisP2P*AD*S*P1XSPrice,PPrice,PQuantity,QQuantity,QS*2–D*2S*2D*2Figure7-2:DerivingForeign’sExportSupplyCurveBasicTariffAnalysisD*1S*1S*1–D*1Propertiesoftheexportsupplycurve:Itintersectstheverticalaxisattheclosedeconomypriceoftheexportingcountry.Itisupwardsloping.Itisflatterthatthedomesticsupplycurveintheexportingcountry.BasicTariffAnalysisFigure7-3:WorldEquilibriumXSPrice,PQuantity,QMDPWQW1BasicTariffAnalysisUsefuldefinitions:Thetermsoftradeistherelativepriceoftheexportablegoodexpressedinunitsoftheimportablegood.Asmallcountryisacountrythatcannotaffectitstermsoftradenomatterhowmuchittradeswiththerestoftheworld.Theanalyticalframeworkwillbebasedoneitherofthefollowing:TwolargecountriestradingwitheachotherAsmallcountrytradingwiththerestoftheworldBasicTariffAnalysisEffectsofaTariff:twolargecountriesAssumethattwolargecountriestradewitheachother.SupposeHomeimposesataxof$2oneverybushelofwheatimported.Thenshipperswillbeunwillingtomovethewheatunlessthepricedifferencebetweenthetwomarketsisatleast$2.Figure7-4illustratestheeffectsofaspecifictariffof$tperunitofwheat.BasicTariffAnalysisXSPTMDD*S*DSPW2QT1QWBasicTariffAnalysisFigure7-4:EffectsofaTariffP*T3tPrice,PQuantity,QPrice,PQuantity,QPrice,PQuantity,QHomemarketWorldmarketForeignmarketHomemarketWorldmarketForeignmarketIntheabsenceoftariff,theworldpriceofwheat(Pw)wouldbeequalizedinbothcountries.Withthetariffinplace,thepriceofwheatrisestoPTatHomeandfallstoP*T

(=PT

–t)atForeignuntilthepricedifferenceis$t.InHome:producerssupplymoreandconsumersdemandless

duetothehigherprice,sothatfewerimportsaredemanded.InForeign:producerssupplylessandconsumersdemandmoreduetothelowerprice,sothatfewerexportsaresupplied.Thus,thevolumeofwheattradeddeclinesduetotheimpositionofthetariff.BasicTariffAnalysisTheincreaseinthedomesticHomepriceislessthanthetariff,becausepartofthetariffisreflectedinadeclineinForeign’sexportprice.IfHomeisasmallcountryandimposesatariff,theforeignexportpricesareunaffectedandthedomesticpriceatHome(theimportingcountry)risesbythefullamountofthetariff.BasicTariffAnalysisFigure7-5:ATariffinaSmallCountrySPrice,PQuantity,QDPW

+tPWImportsaftertariffS1D1ImportsbeforetariffD2S2BasicTariffAnalysisMeasuringtheAmountofProtectionInanalyzingtradepolicyinpractice,itisimportanttoknowhowmuchprotectionatradepolicyactuallyprovides.Onecanexpresstheamountofprotectionasapercentageofthepricethatwouldprevailunderfreetrade.Twoproblemsarisefromthismethodofmeasurement:Inthelargecountrycase,thetariffwilllowertheforeignexportprice.Tariffsmayhavedifferenteffectsondifferentstagesofproductionofagood.BasicTariffAnalysisEffectiverateofprotection

Onemustconsiderboththeeffectsoftariffsonthefinalpriceofagood,andtheeffectsoftariffsonthecostsofinputsusedinproduction.Theactualprotectionprovidedbyatariffwillnotequalthetariffrateifimportedintermediategoodsareusedintheproductionoftheprotectedgood.Example:AEuropeanairplanethatsellsfor$50millionhascost$60milliontoproduce.Halfofthepurchasepriceoftheaircraftrepresentsthecostofcomponentspurchasedfromothercountries.Asubsidyof$10millionfromtheEuropeangovernmentcutsthecostofthevalueaddedtopurchasersoftheairplanefrom$30to$20million.Thus,theeffectiverateofprotectionis(30-20)/20=50%.BasicTariffAnalysis7.2.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffAtariffraisesthepriceofagoodintheimportingcountryandlowersitintheexportingcountry.Asaresultofthesepricechanges:ConsumersloseintheimportingcountryandgainintheexportingcountryProducersgainintheimportingcountryandloseintheexportingcountryGovernmentimposingthetariffgainsrevenueTomeasureandcomparethesecostsandbenefits,weneedtodefineconsumer

and

producersurplus.ConsumerandProducerSurplusConsumersurplusItmeasurestheamountaconsumergainsfromapurchasebythedifferencebetweenthepriceheactuallypaysandthepricehewouldhavebeenwillingtopay.Itcanbederivedfromthemarketdemandcurve.Graphically,itisequaltotheareaunderthedemandcurveandabovetheprice.Example:Supposeapersoniswillingtopay$20perpacketofpills,butthepriceisonly$5.Then,theconsumersurplusgainedbythepurchaseofapacketofpillsis$15.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffFigure7-6:DerivingConsumerSurplusfromtheDemandCurveCostsandBenefitsofaTariff8$129$1010$911DPrice,PQuantity,QFigure7-7:GeometryofConsumerSurplusCostsandBenefitsofaTariffabP1P2DPrice,PQuantity,QQ2Q1ProducersurplusItmeasurestheamountaproducergainsfromasalebythedifferencebetweenthepriceheactuallyreceivesandthepriceatwhichhewouldhavebeenwillingtosell.Itcanbederivedfromthemarketsupplycurve.Graphically,itisequaltotheareaabovethesupplycurveandbelowtheprice.Example:Aproducerwillingtosellagoodfor$2butreceivingapriceof$5gainsaproducersurplusof$3.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffFigure7-8:GeometryofProducerSurplusCostsandBenefitsofaTariffdcP2P1SPrice,PQuantity,QQ2Q1CostsandBenefitsofaTariffMeasuringtheCostandBenefitsIsitpossibletoaddconsumerandproducersurplus?Wecan(algebraically)addconsumerandproducersurplusbecauseanychangeinpriceaffectseachindividualintwoways:AsaconsumerAsaworkerWeassumethatatthemarginadollar’sworthofgainorlosstoeachgroupisofthesamesocialworth.Figure7-9:CostsandBenefitsofaTarifffortheImportingCountryCostsandBenefitsofaTariffPTPWP*TbcdeDa=consumerloss(a+b+c+d)=producergain(a)=governmentrevenuegain(c+e)QTD2S2SS1D1Price,PQuantity,QTheareasofthetwotrianglesbanddmeasurethelosstothenationasawhole(efficiencyloss)andtheareaoftherectangleemeasuresanoffsettinggain(termsoftradegain).Theefficiencylossarisesbecauseatariffdistortsincentivestoconsumeandproduce.Producersandconsumersactasifimportsweremoreexpensivethantheyactuallyare.Trianglebistheproductiondistortionlossandtriangledistheconsumptiondistortionloss.Thetermsoftradegainarisesbecauseatarifflowersforeignexportprices.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffIfthetermsoftradegainisgreaterthantheefficiencyloss,thetariffincreaseswelfarefortheimportingcountry.Inthecaseofasmallcountry,thetariffreduceswelfarefortheimportingcountry.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffFigure7-10:NetWelfareEffectsofaTariffPTPWP*TbdeD=efficiencyloss(b+d)=termsoftradegain(e)ImportsSPrice,PQuantity,QCostsandBenefitsofaTariffTheTermsofTradeArgumentforaTariffForalargecountry(thatis,acountrythatcanaffecttheworldpricethroughtrading),atarifflowersthepriceofimportsandgeneratesatermsoftradebenefit.Thisbenefitmustbecomparedtothecostsofthetariff(productionandconsumptiondistortions).Itispossiblethatthetermsoftradebenefitsofatariffoutweighitscosts.Therefore,freetrademightnotbethebestpolicyforalargecountry.TheOptimumTariff1NationalwelfareTariffrateOptimumtariff,toProhibitivetariffrate,tpFigure7-11a:TheOptimumTariffExportSubsidies:TheoryExportsubsidyApaymentbythegovernmenttoafirmorindividualthatshipsagoodabroadWhenthegovernmentoffersanexportsubsidy,shipperswillexportthegooduptothepointwherethedomesticpriceexceedstheforeignpricebytheamountofthesubsidy.Itcanbeeitherspecificoradvalorem.7.3.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicybaFigure7-11:EffectsofanExportSubsidyOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPSPWP*SPrice,PQuantity,QExportsgfeSubsidydc=producergain(a+b+c)=consumerloss(a+b)=costofgovernmentsubsidy(b+c+d+e+f+g)DSAnexportsubsidyraisespricesintheexportingcountrywhileloweringthemintheimportingcountry.Inaddition,andincontrasttoatariff,theexportsubsidyworsensthetermsoftrade.Anexportsubsidyunambiguouslyleadstocoststhatexceeditsbenefits.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyFigure7-12:Europe’sCommonAgriculturalProgramOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPrice,PQuantity,QSDEUpricewithoutimportsWorldprice=costofgovernmentsubsidySupportpriceExportsImportQuotas:TheoryAnimportquotaisadirectrestrictiononthequantityofagoodthatisimported.Example:TheUnitedStateshasaquotaonimportsofforeigncheese.Therestrictionisusuallyenforcedbyissuinglicensestosomegroupofindividualsorfirms.Example:Theonlyfirmsallowedtoimportcheesearecertaintradingcompanies.Insomecases(e.g.sugarandapparel),therighttosellintheUnitedStatesisgivendirectlytothegovernmentsofexportingcountries.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyAnimportquotaalwaysraisesthedomesticpriceoftheimportedgood.Licenseholdersareabletobuyimportsandresellthematahigherpriceinthedomesticmarket.Theprofitsreceivedbytheholdersofimportlicensesareknownasquotarents.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyWelfareanalysisofimportquotasversusofthatoftariffsThedifferencebetweenaquotaandatariffisthatwithaquotathegovernmentreceivesnorevenue.Inassessingthecostsandbenefitsofanimportquota,itiscrucialtodeterminewhogetstherents.Whentherightstosellinthedomesticmarketareassignedtogovernmentsofexportingcountries,thetransferofrentsabroadmakesthecostsofaquotasubstantiallyhigherthantheequivalenttariff.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPriceinU.S.Market466WorldPrice280bcdDemanda8.456.32Supply5.149.26Price,$/tonQuantityofsugar,milliontonsFigure7-13:EffectsoftheU.S.ImportQuotaonSugarOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyImportquota:2.13milliontons=consumerloss(a+b+c+d)=producergain(a)=quotarents(c)VoluntaryExportRestraintsAvoluntaryexportrestraint(VER)isanexportquotaadministeredbytheexportingcountry.Itisalsoknownasavoluntaryrestraintagreement(VRA).VERsareimposedattherequestoftheimporterandareagreedtobytheexportertoforestallothertraderestrictions.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyAVERisexactlylikeanimportquotawherethelicensesareassignedtoforeigngovernmentsandisthereforeverycostlytotheimportingcountry.AVERisalwaysmorecostlytotheimportingcountrythanatariffthatlimitsimportsbythesameamount.ThetariffequivalentrevenuebecomesrentsearnedbyforeignersundertheVER.Example:About2/3ofthecosttoconsumersofthethreemajorU.S.voluntaryrestraintsintextilesandapparel,steel,andautomobilesisaccountedforbytherentsearnedbyforeigners.AVERproducesalossfortheimportingcountry.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyLocalContentRequirementsAlocalcontentrequirementisaregulationthatrequiresthatsomespecifiedfractionofafinalgoodbeproduceddomestically.Thisfractioncanbespecifiedinphysicalunitsorinvalueterms.Localcontentlawshavebeenwidelyusedbydevelopingcountriestryingtoshifttheirmanufacturingbasefromassemblybackintointermediategoods.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyLocalcontentlawsdonotproduceeithergovernmentrevenueorquotarents.

Instead,thedifferencebetweenthepricesofimportsanddomesticgoodsgetsaveragedinthefinalpriceandispassedontoconsumers.Example:Supposethatautoassemblyfirmsarerequiredtouse50%domesticparts.Thecostofimportedpartsis$6000andthecostofthesamepartsdomesticallyis$10,000.Thentheaveragecostofpartsis$8000(0.5x$6000+0.5x$10,000).Firmsareallowedtosatisfytheirlocalcontentrequirementbyexportinginsteadofusingpartsdomestically.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyOtherTradePolicyInstruments

ExportcreditsubsidiesAformofasubsidizedloantothebuyerofexports.Theyhavethesameeffectasregularexportsubsidies.NationalprocurementPurchasesbythegovernment(orpublicfirms)canbedirectedtowardsdomesticgoods,eveniftheyaremoreexpensivethanimports.Red-tapebarriersSometimesgovernmentsplacesubstantialbarriersbasedonhealth,safetyandcustomsprocedures.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyTheEffectsofTradePolicy:ASummaryTable78-1:EffectsofAlternativeTradePoliciesSummaryAtariffdrivesawedgebetweenforeignanddomesticprices,raisingthedomesticpricebutbylessthanthetariffrate(exceptinthe“small”countrycase).Inthesmallcountrycase,atariffisfullyreflectedindomesticprices.Thecostsandbenefitsofatarifforothertradepolicyinstrumentsmaybemeasuredusingtheconceptsofconsumerandproducersurplus.ThedomesticproducersofagoodgainThedomesticconsumersloseThegovernmentcollectstariffrevenueSummaryThenetwelfareeffectofatariffcanbeseparatedintotwoparts:Eff