审计会计和投资效率外文翻译文献

1、文献信息:文献标题：Auditorspecialization,accountinginformationqualityandinvestmentefficiency(审计师专业化、会计信息质量和投资效率)国外作者：AssawerElaoud,AnisJarboui文献出处：«ResearchinInternationalBusinessandFinance»,2017,42:616-629字数统计：英文2456单词，14366字符；中文4459汉字外文文献：Auditorspecialization,accountinginformationqualityandinves

2、tmentefficiencyAbstractThisstudyisexaminedhowtheauditorspecializationmoderatestheeffectofaccountinginformationqualityoninvestmentefficiency,i.e.,whethertheeffectofaccountinginformationqualityoninvestmentefficiencyisincreasingordecreasingwiththepresenceofthespecialistauditor.Thereachedresultrevealsth

3、attheaccountinginformationqualityappearstohelpdecreasetheoverinvestmentproblem.Similarly,theauditorspecializationhasbeendiscoveredtohelpgreatlyinimprovinginvestmentefficiency,whilereducingtheunderinvestmentproblem.Wefurtherfindthattheaccountinginformationqualityandtheauditorspecializationaretwomecha

4、nismswithsomedegreeofsubstitutioninenhancinginvestmentefficiency.Theaccountinginformationqualityispositivelyassociatedwithinvestmentefficiencyforfirmswhoseauditorisanindustryspecialist.Keywords:Investmentefficiency;Underinvestment;Overinvestment;Auditorspecialization;Accountinginformationquality(AIQ

5、)1.IntroductionAlargetheoreticalandempiricalliteratureexaminestheroleoftheaccountinginformationquality(Bushmanetal.,2001;BushmanandSmith,2001;Bagaeva,2008;Chanetal.,2009;ChanandLee,2009;Zhiyingetal.,2012;Ranetal.,2015).Onelineofresearch(BiddleandHilary,2006;McNicholsandStubben,2008;Biddleetal.,2009;

6、Chenetal.,2011)suggeststhathigherqualityinformationenablesmanagerstoidentifybetterinvestmentopportunities.Severalstudiesalsoproposethatauditorspecializationcanbeusedtoreducetheinformationasymmetryproblems(Almutairietal.,2009;DeBoskeyetal.,2012;DeBoskeyandJiang,2012;Yaghoobnezhadaetal.,2014):Aspecial

7、istknowledgeoftheindustrycanbedevelopedthroughvastauditingexperience,specializedstafftraining,andlargeinvestmentsininformationtechnology.Thisindustry-specificknowledgeallowsspecialistauditorstoprovidehigherqualityauditservicebyreducingtheinformationasymmetrythroughtheirgreaterabilitytodetectsignific

8、antanomalies.Theoreticalmodels(Balsametal.,2003;Lai,2011)predictthat,despitethelimitedevidence,ahighlyacquiredauditqualityisextremelyusefulforimprovinginvestmentefficiencies,especiallywithrespecttooverinvestment.Basedonthesepremises,themainpurposeofthispaperistocombinethesetwomechanismsandanalyzethe

9、effectoftheaccountinginformationquality(AIQ)andtheauditorspecializationoninvestmentefficiency.Chenetal.(2011),whoexaminestherelationshipbetweentheinformationqualityandinvestment,findthatfinancialreportingqualityenhancesinvestmentinprivatefirmsinemergingcountries.Wealsoexpecttofindthisassociationinas

10、ampleofindustrialfirms.Inrelationtotheroleoftheauditorspecializationininvestmentefficiency,tothebestofourknowledge,thisisthefirststudythatempiricallyexaminesitseffectonbothunderinvestmentandoverinvestment.Asanextensionofourresearch,weexaminehowtheauditorspecializationmoderatestheAIQeffectoninvestmen

11、tefficiency,i.e.,whethersuchanAIQeffectoninvestmentefficiencyisincreasingordecreasingwiththepresenceofaspecialistauditor.Wecouldexpectbotheffects:Ontheonehand,thereductionoftheinformationasymmetryandmorereliableaccountingnumbers,duetohigherAIQ,couldleadtoamoreeffectivemonitoringduetothespecialistaud

12、itorsand,consequently,theAIQeffectoninvestmentefficiencywouldturnouttobehigherforfirmswithgreaterAIQandauditorspecialization.Ontheotherhand,firmswithhigheraccountingqualityarelikelytohelpthemanagerreducetheadverseselectionandmoralhazardandallowmanagerstobetteridentifyinvestmentopportunities(Biddlean

13、dHilary,2006).So,underthisassumption,wewouldexpectthattheimportanceofAIQinreducinginformationasymmetrieswillbehigherinfirmswhoseauditorisanindustryspecialistthanthatwithacompanywhoseauditorisnotaspecialist.OurresultsshowthattheAIQreducesoverinvestment,whilethespecialistauditorreducestheunderinvestme

14、nt.Moreover,ourresultsalsorevealthattheAIQeffectoninvestmentefficiencyispositiveforthefirmswhoseauditorisanindustryspecialist,highlightingthesubstitutionroleofAIQandauditorspecializationinreducinginformationasymmetriesandmonitoringmanager'sbehaviortosuchawayasexpropriationcanbegreatlyrestricted.

15、2 .Literaturereviewandhypothesisdevelopment2.1.1 nvestmentefficiencyandtheaccountinginformationquality(AIQ)SincehigherAIQmakesmanagersmoreaccountablebyallowingbettermonitoring,anditmayreduceadverseselectionandmoralhazard,andthereafterdecreasesinformationasymmetries,itcouldtherebygreatlyreducetheover

16、investmentandtheunderinvestmentproblems.Inaddition,theAIQcouldimproveinvestmentefficiencybyenablingmanagerstomakebetterinvestmentdecisionsthroughabetteridentificationofprojectsandmoretruthfulaccountingnumbersforinternaldecisionmakers(Bushmanetal.,2001;BushmanandSmith,2001;McNicholsandStubben,2008;Go

17、marizandBellesta,2014).Empirically,priorstudiesargueandfindevidencethatearningsmanagementleadstooverinvestmentbecauseitdistortstheinformationusedbymanagers(McNicholsandStubben,2008).Inturn,Hirshleiferetal.(2004),Biddleetal.(2009)andChenetal.(2011)examinetheeffectofinformationqualityontwoinefficients

18、cenarios,overinvestmentandunderinvestment,andreportedthathigherinformationqualityhelpsgreatlyinencouragingunderinvestmentcompaniestomakeinvestments,andoverinvestmentcompaniestodecreasetheirinvestmentlevel.Consistentwiththisview,GomarizandBellesta(2014)findthatconservatismleadstoreducingbothoverinves

19、tmentandunderinvestment,becauseitreducesinvestment-cashflowsensitivitywithregardtooverinvestmentfirmsandfacilitatesaccesstoexternalfinancingregardingunderinvestmentfirms.Inthisrespect,weundertaketoanalyzetheAIQimpactoninvestmentefficiency,andourfirsthypothesissetupasfollows:H1.FirmswithhigherAIQwill

20、showhigherinvestmentefficiency.SinceweexaminewhethertheAIQreducestheunderinvestmentandtheoverinvestment,weshouldalsotestthefollowingtwosub-hypotheses:H1a.FirmswithhigherAIQwillmitigatetheoverinvestmentproblem.H1b.FirmswithhigherAIQwillmitigatetheunderinvestmentproblem.2.1.2 nvestmentefficiencyandaud

21、itorspecializationTheroleoftheauditorspecializationinreducingmanagers"discretionanddiscipliningtheirinvestmentdecisionshasbeendiscussedintherelatedliteraturemainlybyGuletal.(2009)andDeBoskeyandJiang(2012).However,thisliteraturehasalsoemphasizedtheroleplayedbyauditorsunderinformationasymmetry,hi

22、ghlightingthattheuseoftheauditorspecializationisamechanismwherebywecanattenuateinformationalasymmetriesandagencycostsbetweenshareholders,creditorsandmanagers.Auditorsseemtohavedifficultymeasuringamountsofdiscretionarypartandhavebeenforcedtoreissuetheirreportsbecauseofregulatorsfindings(Balsametal.,2

23、003;DeBoskeyetal.,2012;DeBoskeyandJiang,2012).Hence,anempiricalquestionmaybeposedastowhethertheauditorindustryspecializationissimilarlyassociatedwithinvestmentefficiency.Anexaminationoftheliteraturesuggeststhatfirmswithhighinvestmentopportunitiesmayneedhighqualityauditsbecausetheyhaveaweakinternalco

24、ntrolsystemwhichmaynotkeepupwiththegrowthpace,resultinginhighercontrolandauditrisk(Tsuietal.,2001;Cahanetal.,2006;Lai,2009).Basedonthis,oursecondhypothesisanditssub-hypothesesareasfollows:H2.Thefirmsthatundertakeaspecialistauditorshowgreaterinvestmentefficiency.H2a.Thefirmsthatundertakeaspecialistau

25、ditorcanmitigateoverinvestmentproblems.H2b.Thefirmsthatundertakeaspecialistauditorcanmitigateunderinvestmentproblems.2.1.3 heAIQeffectoninvestmentefficiencyconditionedtotheauditorspecializationAsidefromcheckingtheisolatedeffectoftheaccountinginformationqualityandtheauditorspecializationoninvestmente

26、fficiency(BiddleandHilary,2006;Cahanetal.,2006;DeBoskeyetal.,2012;DeBoskeyandJiang,2012;GomarizandBellesta,2014;Luetal.,2016),weexaminetheirinteractioneffect,i.e.,weinvestigatewhethertheeffectoftheAIQoninvestmentefficiencyisincreasingordecreasingwiththepresenceoftheauditorindustryspecialization.Inth

27、issense,theAIQeffectoninvestmentdecisionscouldbemitigatedbytheabsenceofthespecialistauditorsbecauseauditorspecializationinagivensectorhaveconsiderableexperienceandmayexercisetheiroversightroleonmanagementinabidtoreduceoverinvestmentandcanalsobebeneficialformanagerstomakepositiveinvestmentsinsituatio

28、nsofunderinvestment.Accordingtothis,theauditorspecializationstandsasacrucialinstrumentusefulforreducingtheinformationasymmetryandtheearningsmanagement(DeBoskeyetal.,2012;DeBoskeyandJiang,2012;Maryetal.,2012;MaryandBing,2012).Hence,itfollowsthattheAIQimpactoninvestmentefficiencywouldturnouttobestrong

29、erforacompanywhoseauditorisanindustryspecialist.Thespecialistauditorcanmitigatetheadverseselectionandmoralhazardandcanprovideguaranteestotheinformationquality.Accordingly,ourthirdhypothesiswhichisputforwardstipulatesthattherelationshipbetweentheAIQandtheinvestmentefficiencydependshighlyonthepresence

30、oftheauditorspecialization.H3.TherelationshipbetweeninvestmentefficiencyandtheAIQshouldprovetobestrongerforfirmswhoseauditorisanindustryspecialist.H3a.FirmsusingaspecialistauditorandtheAIQwillmitigateoverinvestmentproblems.H3b.FirmsusingaspecialistauditorandtheAIQwillmitigateunderinvestmentproblems.

31、3 .ResearchmethodandsampleThequalitativemethodischaracterizedbyitspracticalinefficiencyinthefield,sincethecriteriaofloyalty,credibility,validationandtransferabilitycanbelostbeforetheprofessionalsecrets.Thisstudydoesnotfocusonaqualitativemethodbecausethestudyregionstimulatesit.Wehavebeenabletouseaqua

32、ntitativemethodwhichreferstoworkwhosedataarestatisticallyanalyzable.Formostresearchers,talkingaboutquantitativeresearchmeansstudyinglargedulyselectedsamples,whereasthequalitativesearchescoveredusuallyonlysomecases.Inthisstudy,thequantitativetechniqueallowsforbettertestingoftheoriesandassumptions,and

33、allowsmeasuringmorerigorouslytheusedvariables.Oursampleperiodcoverstheperiod20072013,andforfurtheridentificationofthestudyselectedvariables,weneedtocheckthedatafortheyears2006and2005.Thesampleselectioncoversonlyindustrialfirms,whereasfirmsrelatedtofinanceareexcludedfromthesample.Theinformationiscoll

34、ectedfromthecompany"sannualreports,asdownloadedfromtheTunisiaStockExchangewebsite,thefinancialmarketCouncil,whilesomedatahavebeengatheredmanually.Tunisiaisaninterestingsettingforanumberofreasons.Firstly,itrepresentsalessdevelopedcapitalmarketthantheU.S.andU.K.,andsecondlytheinformationasymmetry

35、andtheauditormonitoringrolearehigher.Theseadditionalrequirementfactorshaveultimatelyledustogetasamplemadeupof231firm-yearobservations,pertinenttotheinvestmentefficiencymodelconstitution.Table1below,depictsthefirm'sdistributionaccordingtoselectedsample.Table1.Analysisofthesampleaccordingtotheinve

36、stmentefficiencPanel:analysisbyyearunderinvestmentPercentageoverinvestmentPercentage20132517.12%89.41%20122315.75%1011.76%20112416.43%910.58%20102013.69%1315.29%2009149.58%1922.35%20082013.69%1315.29%20072013.69%1315.29%Total146100%85100%Theresults,figuringonTable1presentonly85observationsbelongingt

37、otheoverinvestmentgroup,whilemostofsampleobservationsrelatetotheunderinvestmentgroup.Asidefromthat,thistableindicatesthatthemajorityofsampleobservationspertaintotheunderinvestmentforallyears,exceptfortheyear2009,inwhichthesample-depictedunderinvestmentappearstohaveapercentageof9.58%whiletheoverinves

38、tmentproportionturnsouttobeof22.35%.4 .ConclusionsSeveralpreviouslyelaboratedstudieshaverevealedthattheaccountinginformationqualitycangreatlyhelpinimprovinginvestmentefficiencybyreducinginformationasymmetriesthatgiverisetofrictionssuchasmoralhazardandadverseselection.Thisworkisdesignedasanextensiont

39、othoseresearchesbyattemptingtodocumentthepanelthroughwhichaccountinginformationqualitycanrelatetotheinvestmentefficiency.Morespecifically,thespecialattempthasbeenmadetotestthehypothesisthatahigheraccountinginformationqualitycanbeassociatedwitheithermitigatingtheoverinvestmentortheunderinvestmentprob

40、lems.Foramorereliablyeffectiveestimationofaccountinginformationquality,anappealhasbeenmadetothemeasureproposedbyStubben(2010),consideringthatdiscretionaryrevenuesstandasaproxyforearningsmanagement.Inthisrespect,priorconductedstudiesdealingwithsuchasubjecthavealsoputagreatemphasisontheroleplayedbyaud

41、itorsininformationasymmetry,highlightingthattheuseoftheauditorspecializationmaystandasamechanismthatcanattenuateinformationalasymmetriesandagencycost.Indeed,theuseofaspecializedserviceauditorcanprovideassuranceontheinformationquality.Inthisparticularcontext,theauthorsfindthatfirmsauditedbyaqualified

42、auditorturnouttobelikelytocommunicateforecastinformationonfuturecashflowsmorecrediblythanthoseauditedbyanon-specialistauditor.Thebeneficialeffectsofauditorindustryspecializationaremostmarkedintheindustrialfirms.Hence,oursecondhypothesisfocusesontheauditorindustryspecializationimpactontheinvestmentef

43、ficiency.Further,anexaminationofwhethertheauditorspecializationdoeshaveinfluencesontheinvestmentefficiency.Inadditiontocheckingtheisolatedeffectoftheaccountinginformationqualityandtheauditorspecializationoninvestmentefficiency,weexaminewhethertheAIQeffecthelpseitherincreaseordecreasetheinvestmenteff

44、iciencyforfirmswhoseauditorisanindustryspecialist.Inourpaper,theAIQandtheauditorspecializationeffectoninvestmentefficiencyhasbeenanalyzedthrougharepresentativesamplederivedfromaTunisiancontext,inwhichAIQisexpectedtobehigher,overtheperiod2007-2013.Accordingtosomepreviouslyconductedstudies(Biddleetal.

45、,2009;Chenetal.,2011;GomarizandBellesta,2014)hasbeendiscovered,thatintheU.S.andemergingmarkets,thefinancialreportingqualitycangreatlyhelpinsolvingunderinvestmentproblems.InTunisia,theauditorspecializationprovestoconstitutethemajormechanismimplementedtocontrolunderinvestment,andAIQisrelevantonlywhent

46、heauditqualitylevelishigh.Asindicatedbyourattainedresults,ahigherAIQandahigheruseofauditorspecializationappeartocontributeinincreasinginvestmentefficiency.However,ifwedistinguishbetweenoverinvestmentandunderinvestment,itcanbenotedthattheAIQplaysanimportantroleinreducingoverinvestment.Similarly,thesp

47、ecialistauditorspresenceisamechanismthatcontributespositivelytoimprovingtheinvestmentefficiencyinunderinvestmentscenarios.Inaddition,wefindthattheaccountinginformationqualityandtheauditorspecializationhaveasubstitutionrelationshipinimprovementofinvestmentefficiency:Therelationshipbetweeninvestmentef

48、ficiencyandAIQisstrongerforfirmswhoseauditorisanindustryspecialist.Ourachievedresultsareexclusivelylimitedtofindingsfromoursample,whichincludesonlyindustrialcompaniesinTunisia,forthisreasonoursampleof33firmscouldbeconsideredtoosmall.Despitesuchlimits,thestudyresultsmaybepotentiallyusefulforsharehold

49、ers,investors,managersandpolicymakerstohelpinfurtherenhancingfirms'investmentefficiency.Asafutureresearchperspective,onecouldconsiderotherinvestmentaffectingfactors,andextendtheresultfindingstocompaniesbelongingtoothercountries.中文译文：审计师专业化、会计信息质量和投资效率摘要本研究探讨了审计师专业化如何调节会计信息质量对投资效率的影响，即会计信息质量对投资效率

50、的影响是否随着审计师专业化的存在而增加或减少。结果表明，会计信息质量有助于减少投资过度的问题。同样，审计师专业化也非常有助于提高投资效率，同时减少投资不足的问题。我们进一步发现，会计信息质量和审计师专业化是提高投资效率的两种机制，具有一定的替代性。公司的审计师为行业专家，则会计信息质量与投资效率呈正相关关系。关键词：投资效率；投资不足；投资过度；审计师专业化；会计信息质量（AIQ）1 .引言大量的理论和实证文献研究了会计信息质量的作用（布什曼等人，2001;布什曼和史密斯，2001;巴干恩，2008;陈等人，2009;陈和李，2009;志英等人，2012;冉等人，2015）。一系列的研究（比德

51、尔和希拉里，2006;麦克尼科尔斯和施图本，2008;比德尔等人，2009;陈等人，2011）表明，更高质量的会计信息使管理者能够识别更好的投资机会。一些研究还提出，审计师专业化可以减少信息不对称问题（Almutairi等人，2009;德波斯基等人，2012；德波斯基和江，2012；Yaghoobnezhad咻人，2014）：通过丰富的审计经验、专门的员工培训以及对信息技术的大量投资，专家对该行业的知识得以开发应用。这种特定行业的知识允许专业审计师通过检测重大异常的高能力来减少信息不对称，从而提供更高质量的审计服务。理论模型（鲍尔萨姆等人，2003;拉伊，2011）预测，尽管有限的证据表明，高

52、质量的审计服务对提高投资效率极为有利，尤其是在过度投资方面。基于这些前提，本文的主要目的是结合这两种机制，分析会计信息质量（AIQ）和审计专业化对投资效率的影响。陈等人（2011）研究了会计信息质量与投资之间的关系，他们发现财务报告质量提高了新兴国家私营企业的投资水平。我们也希望在工业企业的样本中找到这种关联。关于审计师专业化在投资效率方面的作用，据我们所知，这是第一次研究，实证研究审计师专业化对投资不足和投资过度的影响。作为我们研究的延伸，我们研究了审计师专业化如何调节会计信息质量对投资效率的影响，也就是说，由于专业审计师的出现，这种会计信息质量对投资效率的影响是否得到增加或减少。我们可以期

53、待两种效果：一方面，由于会计信息质量较高，减少了信息不对称，促进了更可靠的会计数据；由于审计师专业化，促使了更有效的监督。因此，对于具有更高的会计信息质量和审计师专业化的公司来说，会计信息质量对投资效率的影响将会更高。另一方面，会计信息质量越高的公司越有可能帮助管理人员减少逆向选择和道德风险，从而使管理者更好地识别投资机会（比德尔和希拉里，2006）。因此，在这种假设下，我们预计，与审计师不是行业专家的那些公司相比，在拥有行业专家审计师的公司中，会计信息质量在减少信息不对称方面的重要性会更高。我们的研究结果表明，会计信息质量减少了过度投资，而专业审计师减少了投资不足。止匕外，我们的结果还表明，