上半年已崩！全球宏观数据观察报告

1、Finally, the size and scope of the policy response has in- creased. With new programs announced this week, our 2020 fiscal thrust estimate has increased to 2.6% of GDP. These measures do not include enormous public sector contingent commitments. This week, Italy announced enhanced loan guarantees (w

2、orth up to 400 billion) and the Fed detailedthe same level as our baseline by the end of the year but de- lays the recovery one month to begin in June. Table 1: Global real GDP Forecast Alt. scenario %mm%3m3m%mm%3m3mprograms scheduled to provide up to $2.3 trillion in credit toFebruary-3.7-3.4-3.7-3

3、.4businesses and state and local governments in which the USMarch-5.0-14.7-1.0-10.0Treasury provides credit protection.April-7.0-31.5-7.0-23.6May13.0-28.4-3.0-31.0Looking for first-out signs for ChinaJune1.1-12.611.0-26.4July0.629.42.0-2.1Data watching for China takes on added importance given itsAu

4、gust0.633.70.935.1potential to provide a template for what to expect as success-September0.225.60.641.2ful containment policies are eventually lifted elsewhere. NextOctober0.87.30.728.0weeks releases are likely to underscore how strong growthNovember0.86.70.610.7rates can become as activity resumes,

5、 even if normalization isDecember0.87.90.88.7incomplete. While we believe that domestic spending re- mained depressed in March, and external demand will remain depressed for at least another few months, we forecast a 35%m/m jump in industrial production and 60%m/m surge in retail sales (Figure 2). H

6、ow much to extrapolate the China recovery to elsewhere is debatable. Chinas transition from virus suppression to mitigation is supported by heightened surveillance policies. The population is being divided into groups that limit freedom of movement, with enforcement supported by widespread temperatu

7、re checks (upon entering buildings and in the transportation system), extensive contact tracing through CCTV, facial recognition, and monitoring of mobile devices.Figure 2: China IP and retail salesIndex, Dec 2019=100; Mar 20 fcst boxed11010090IP80706050Retail sales40Jan 19Apr 19Jul 19Oct 19Jan 20So

8、urce: J.P. MorganTime is GDPWhile we continue to forecast a widespread move away from virus containment beginning in May, the exact timing of this shift will play a key role in determining global growth rates for this quarter and next. To highlight this point, we have compared the monthly profile em

9、bedded in our global GDP outlook with an alternative scenario that leaves global GDP atSource: J.P. MorganThis modest change produces a far more volatile growth path, with a much larger drop this quarter followed by a stronger rebound the next (Table 1). Even though GDP ends the year at the same lev

10、el, the alternative path incorporates a bigger loss in global output as the recovery takes hold more slowly.A different trickle-down theoryWhile the impact of DM liquidity support has so far largely been limited to investment-grade credits, it is trickling down to EM assets as it boosts risk appetit

11、e. This support, along with increasing signals from EM central banks that they are willing to temporarily suspend institutional restraints and pro- vide unconventional support to government and corporate bond markets, has fashioned a semblance of order in EM markets. Indeed, credit spreads have ease

12、d and exchange rates have appreciated from the lows in late March. The seeming calm in EM markets should not, however, be taken as a sign that the underlying stress has eased and one can easily envis- age another material step down in asset prices if the EM cen- tral banks, governments, and the IMF

13、do not follow through on expectations for more comprehensive and extensive liquid- ity backstop arrangements.OPEC+ agrees on output cutsAlthough no formal agreement has been announced, Saudi Arabia and Russia together with other members of the OPEC+ alliance have reportedly agreed to slash output by

14、 about 10 mbd (10% of global pre-crisis supply) in May and June. The alliance called on the US and Canada and other producing countries to cut another 5 mbd when G20 energy ministers meet on Friday. The OPEC+ decision is in line with our view that global output needs to be taken down by 7-10mbd over

15、 the next three months just to prevent world storage capacity being hit that could force Brent to drop below$10/bbl in the near term. A cut of 10 mbd would normalize spare storage by July that, in turn, could push prices to around$40/bbl by the second half of the year when the global econ- omy is ex

16、pected to start recovering.Japan: deeper recession, bigger stimulusThis week, Japan finally declared a monthlong state of emer- gency for seven prefectures (including Tokyo) that comprise about half of Japans GDP. In response, the Cabinet approved a FY2020 fiscal package worth 108tn (19.4% of GDP),

17、though the direct support through the governments general account supplementary budget represents only 16.7tn (3.0% of GDP). We now see a fiscal thrust of 0.9%-pt (up from 0.7%-pt) for 2020 and 0.1%-pt (up from 0%-pt) for 2021an outlook that still pales in comparison to the huge fiscal stimu- lus pr

18、ograms being enacted elsewhere. We also see real GDP plunging 17% ar this quarter. Compared to the US and Euro area, the voluntary nature of Japans lockdown is expected to produce a milder growth shock, but also runs the risk of a more damaging outbreak that could ultimately result in a worse macroe

19、conomic outturn. We pencil in only a modest rebound in 2H20.We expect the much weaker GDP trajectory to push Japan back into deflation for the first time since August 2013. We now forecast core CPI inflation (using the BoJs preferred measure) to dip just below zero later this year. The failure to bu

20、ild a lasting return to inflation should compel the BoJ to rethink its policy stance at its April 28 meeting. Prior to the pandemic, the BoJ had been reluctant to push rates more deeply negative, fearing the impact on bank lending. Rate cuts may still be a bridge too far.Pandemic delays Brexit trans

21、itionTo date, the UK has resisted the idea that the COVID-19 out- break meant the end of the Brexit transition period would have to be delayed. But with no bandwidth available on the EU side for that discussion, and with UK PM Johnson hospi- talized, the need to create more time for discussion looks

22、 in- creasingly inevitable. Under the existing Withdrawal Agree- ment, a decision to extend the transition has to be taken by the end of June. We expect the UK to push for just a six-month delay, but think the most likely outcome is that both sides ultimately agree to a one-year extension proposed b

23、y the EU.EMEA: Multiple tools for multiple objectivesEM EMEA continues to ease monetary policy in response to a bleak growth outlook and rising financial stability risks. Butthese actions have tended to weaken currencies and fuel capi- tal outflows. Some innovative uses of toolkits have resulted, wi

24、th lending facilities and QE supporting market functioning and fiscal policies. Short-end policy rate moves have reflected different tolerances across the region for currency deprecia- tion. The most extreme case this week occurred in Hungary, where the NBH simultaneously hiked and eased: raising ov

25、er- night and weekly lending rates while expanding QE and lend- ing schemes. Its approach resembles those taken by central banks in Romania and Turkey, which have a long history of direct liquidity management and temporary rate hikes to ad- dress currency weakness. The SARB has been more willing to

26、accept FX weakness given South Africas deteriorating out- look, and Polands NBP was able to deliver a surprise 50bp rate cut this week while also adding state-guaranteed bonds to its pool of QE-eligible assets. In Israel, the BoI cut 15bp to a record low of 0.1%likely its effective lower boundand al

27、so announced a small business credit facility.Contrasting pandemic policies in LatAmPolicy responses to the pandemic have varied across Latin America. Erratic approaches by both Brazil and Mexico have negative implications for the timing and magnitude of their eventual recoveries. In Mexico, incomin

28、g hard data for Feb- ruary reveal that the shock from Asia had already rippled through supply chains in 1Q. The combination of a muddled public health response matched by a disappointing economic plan appears likely to delay the 2H recovery, prompting us to revise down 2020 growth another half a per

29、cent, to -7.5%. In Brazil, President Bolsonaro has criticized his health minister and the decision by some state governors to keep social dis- tancing measures through April. Meanwhile, the Congress is now voting on its own measures without the support of the government. This lack of cohesion risks

30、reducing the effec- tiveness of measures taken, thereby prolonging the crisis in Brazil and adding to the downside risks to growth. Policy responses have been stronger and more coherent in the Ande- an market-based economies. Yet even these may face down- side risks as quarantines are extended.Edito

31、r: Gabriel de Kock (1-212) 622-6718 HYPERLINK mailto:gabriel.s.dekock gabriel.s.dekockCarlton Strong (1-212) 834-5612 HYPERLINK mailto:carlton.m.strong carlton.m.strongJoseph Lupton (1-212) 834-5735 HYPERLINK mailto:joseph.p.lupton joseph.p.luptonGlobal economic outlook sum- maryApril 9, 2020Global

32、economic outlook summaryReal GDPReal GDPConsumer prices % over a year ago % over previous period, saar % over a year ago2019202020214Q191Q202Q203Q204Q201Q214Q192Q204Q202Q21United States2.3-7.7 6.2 2.1-10.0-40.0 23.0 13.0 12.0 2.00.4 0.2 1.5 Latin America0.6-4.2 2.2-0.6-4.9 -22.8 12.0 3.9 2.8 3.12.7

33、3.1 3.6 Canada1.6-3.32.70.3-5.5-18.510.05.04.02.11.52.1 2.2Argentina-2.2-4.5 1.7 -3.9-7.0 -16.0 9.0 1.0 1.5 52.253.141.2 35.5Brazil1.1-3.22.42.0-6.0-20.011.54.02.83.42.63.0 4.0Chile0.8-2.02.7-15.53.0-16.024.03.01.02.73.1 3.2 3.2 Colombia3.3-2.52.41.9-4.5-19.010.05.02.83.83.33.4 3.6Ecuador0.1-2.7-1.2

34、-2.7-2.5-10.03.0-3.00.00.2-0.3-0.3-0.3Mexico-0.1-7.5 2.0 -0.5-5.0 -35.512.0 5.5 4.02.92.8 3.3 3.4Peru2.2-1.53.12.2-3.0-17.014.53.03.51.91.61.9 2.7Uruguay0.2-0.7-0.7-2.2-2.0-10.012.02.03.08.48.76.4 6.4Venezuela.Asia/PacificJapan4.1-0.5 6.4 0.7-4.4 1.0 3.0-7.1-22.2 19.9 -4.0-17.0 17.4 7.8 3.7 7.0 5.5

35、0.43.02.60.9 1.1 0.5-0.4 -0.6 0.0 Australia1.8-3.97.12.1-1.4-33.56.644.13.51.82.12.0 2.0New Zealand2.3-4.810.12.1-2.7-36.95.556.79.71.91.30.6 1.0EM Asia5.10.7 7.55.3-27.932.4 20.65.54.4 3.73.31.2 1.3China6.11.19.26.0-40.857.423.95.64.14.34.11.2 0.8India4.00.77.44.1-8.5-21.938.09.57.55.84.62.4 3.8Ex

36、China/India2.8-0.1 3.14.3-4.6 -4.1 3.13.3 3.4 1.20.60.5 1.2 Hong Kong-1.2-4.0 4.1 -1.2-10.5 -7.0 9.010.0 3.5 3.01.2 0.5 1.6 Indonesia5.02.03.04.90.0-0.72.02.03.52.92.01.9 2.1Korea2.00.82.65.1-2.5-1.00.52.03.50.30.40.4 1.0Malaysia4.3-1.24.02.2-7.0-6.85.54.04.01.00.1 -1.3 -0.3 Philippines5.90.9 5.99.2

37、-5.0-10.0 6.56.25.61.52.2 1.61.1 Singapore0.7-3.91.00.6-10.6-11.04.02.00.80.6-0.4-0.5 0.4Taiwan2.70.62.97.8-5.0-3.53.74.23.20.7-0.50.4 1.2Thailand2.4-3.33.41.0-10.0-9.34.53.23.20.4-0.8-1.0 1.1Western Europe1.3-3.54.60.4-13.9-23.846.03.21.51.10.10.6 2.0Euro area1.2-3.44.70.5-15.0-22.045.03.51.51.0-0.

38、10.5 2.1Germany0.6-3.74.70.1-15.0-22.045.03.51.51.20.31.2 2.4France1.3-3.54.7-0.2-15.0-22.045.03.51.51.30.00.5 2.2Italy0.3-4.05.0-1.2-20.0-16.045.03.51.30.3-0.40.7 2.1Spain2.0-4.04.11.7-15.0-24.040.03.51.50.5-0.50.7 2.3Norway2.4-3.43.60.7-8.5-31.048.01.51.31.60.7 1.2 2.3 Sweden1.3-4.03.90.6-9.5-32.0

39、50.02.01.51.70.20.3 1.7United Kingdom1.4-3.74.10.1-10.0-30.050.02.51.51.40.50.7 1.5EMEA EM2.0-4.64.6 3.2-5.2-34.227.88.35.34.34.1 4.1 4.1Czech Republic2.6-5.5 5.0 1.9-10.0-40.055.05.53.23.02.7 2.2 1.8 Hungary5.0-6.3 5.34.1-5.0-50.080.06.52.83.42.1 1.9 2.8 Israel3.5-2.55.04.2-9.6-18.514.812.63.60.4-0

40、.30.0 0.6Poland4.0-5.2 5.6 0.8-10.0-45.060.05.53.62.83.12.8 2.5Romania4.1-5.02.86.2 -13.0-31.429.27.9-1.23.72.02.7 3.4Russia1.3-4.04.52.4-0.3-34.021.56.56.53.33.2 4.3 3.4South Africa0.1-7.05.1-1.4-10.1-40.435.025.01.03.73.44.3 4.9Turkey0.9-4.53.78.0-3.9-26.80.05.710.010.310.98.4 9.3Global2.6-3.6 5.5

41、 1.9-14.7 -12.6 25.5 7.9 5.4 2.41.5 1.0 1.7 Developed markets1.7-5.5 5.0 0.4-10.4-30.4 28.9 9.4 6.2 1.50.3 0.4 1.6Emerging markets3.9-0.8 6.34.1-21.2 14.5 20.3 5.7 4.3 3.73.3 1.9 2.0Global PPP weighted3.0-2.7 5.7 2.4-15.4 -7.5 25.4 7.3 5.1 2.92.1 1.3 2.0Note: For some emerging economies seasonally a

42、djusted GDP data are estimated by J.P. Morgan. Bold denotes changes from last edition of Global Data Watch, with arrows show- ing the direction of changes. Underline indicates beginning of J.P. Morgan forecasts. Unless noted, concurrent nominal GDP weights calculated with current FX rates are used i

43、n computing our global and regional aggregates. Regional CPI aggregates exclude Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela. Regional GDP aggregates exclude Venezuela. Source: J.P. Morgan. Please note the long-form nomenclature for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan is: Mainland China; Hong Kong SAR, China; and Taiw

44、an, China.Carlton Strong (1-212) 834-5612 HYPERLINK mailto:carlton.m.strong carlton.m.strongJoseph Lupton (1-212) 834-5735 HYPERLINK mailto:joseph.p.lupton joseph.p.luptonG-3 economic outlook detailGlobal Data WatchApril 9, 2020 2019 2020 20212019202020214Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3QUnited StatesReal GDP2.3-7.76

45、.22.1-10.0-40.023.013.012.06.03.5Private consumption2.6-11.27.51.8-14.5-53.037.018.016.05.53.0Equipment investment1.3-6.82.5-4.3-14.1-10.0-1.02.05.05.05.0Non-residential construction-4.3-7.31.2-7.2-3.8-13.0-5.02.04.04.04.0Intellectual property products7.52.75.52.84.00.6-1.07.07.07.07.0Residential co

46、nstruction-1.51.13.76.59.0-16.03.04.05.06.07.0Inventory change ($ bn saar)67.015.257.713.1-10.6-3.030.544.137.972.371.2Government spending2.31.92.62.51.61.11.52.43.03.02.9Exports of goods and services0.00.21.62.10.6-2.01.81.81.81.82.0Imports of goods and services1.0-2.92.2-8.4-5.8-5.06.03.01.81.82.0

47、Domestic final sales contribution2.3-7.65.91.6-10.2-39.222.012.411.75.13.5Inventories contribution0.1-0.20.2-1.0-0.40.10.90.3-0.20.80.0Net trade contribution-0.10.10.11.50.6-1.00.10.30.50.20.1Consumer prices (%oya)1.80.81.12.02.10.40.40.20.11.51.4Excluding food and energy (%oya)2.22.01.12.32.32.21.8

48、1.61.21.11.0Core PCE deflator (%oya)1.61.61.01.61.71.71.51.41.10.90.9Federal budget balance (% of GDP, FY)-4.6-16.0-12.0Personal saving rate (%)7.910.16.97.69.513.79.08.27.26.86.6Unemployment rate (%)3.711.76.83.53.820.014.08.87.36.86.7Industrial production, manufacturing-0.2-1.82.5-0.5-3.0-10.07.04

49、.03.02.02.5Euro areaReal GDP1.2-3.44.70.5-15.0-22.045.03.51.51.51.5Private consumption1.3-5.13.00.5-15.0-25.035.01.31.31.31.3Capital investment5.5-4.44.017.9-15.0-35.050.02.02.02.02.0Government consumption1.62.41.71.42.55.01.01.51.51.51.5Exports of goods and services2.5-4.33.41.7-10.0-25.025.03.03.0

50、3.03.0Imports of goods and services3.8-3.33.49.2-10.0-25.025.03.03.03.03.0Domestic final sales contribution2.1-3.22.84.0-10.7-20.731.21.41.41.41.4Inventories contribution-0.50.31.8-0.5-3.9-0.212.92.00.00.00.0Net trade contribution-0.4-0.60.1-3.1-0.4-1.10.90.10.10.10.1Consumer prices (HICP, %oya)1.20

51、.51.71.01.1-0.10.20.50.92.12.0ex food, alcohol and energy1.01.01.51.21.10.91.01.11.31.51.5General govt. budget balance (% of GDP, FY)-1.0-1.0Unemployment rate (%)7.68.28.47.57.78.48.48.48.48.48.4Industrial productionJapan-1.7-8.87.3-5.7-15.0-50.0100.010.02.02.02.0Real GDP0.7-4.41.0-7.1-4.0-17.07.05.

52、50.40.41.4Private consumption0.2-4.62.1-10.6-4.0-20.014.58.00.50.50.8Business investment0.7-8.60.1-17.3-5.0-20.0-8.012.00.50.51.0Residential construction2.0-3.21.4-9.7-10.02.02.02.01.01.01.0Public investment2.83.51.42.82.04.04.03.01.0-0.5-0.5Government consumption1.91.50.80.91.01.0-0.73.70.00.01.5Ex

53、ports of goods and services-1.8-8.30.5-0.3-14.0-25.05.03.01.51.52.9Imports of goods and services-0.7-4.81.8-10.2-12.0-10.011.03.00.80.81.5Domestic final sales contribution0.8-3.61.5-9.0-3.0-13.86.67.20.40.40.9Inventories contribution0.0-0.3-0.20.1-0.7-0.31.5-1.6-0.1-0.10.3Net trade contribution-0.2-

54、0.6-0.21.8-0.3-2.8-1.00.00.10.10.2Consumer prices (%oya)0.5-0.3-0.10.50.3-0.4-0.5-0.6-0.50.00.2ex food and energy0.40.10.10.40.20.10.0-0.1-0.1-0.10.0General govt. net lending (% of GDP, CY)-2.6-2.9Unemployment rate (%)2.42.82.82.32.42.93.03.02.92.82.8Industrial production-2.5-11.10.0-15.20.5-40.50.0

55、16.01.01.01.0Memo: Global industrial production0.8-2.24.70.0-12.52.620.96.22.72.52.7%oya0.0-3.5-4.6-1.10.35.47.23.5Note: More forecast details for the G-3 and other countries can be found on J.P. Morgans Morgan Markets client web site. Source: J.P. MorganJoseph Lupton (1-212) 834-5735 HYPERLINK mail

56、to:joseph.p.lupton joseph.p.luptonOlya Borichevska (1-212) 834-5398 HYPERLINK mailto:olya.e.borichevska ol HYPERLINK mailto:ya.e.borichevska ya.e.borichevskaGlobal Central Bank WatchGlobal Central Bank WatchApril 9, 2020raterate (%pa)LastNextnext changeJun 20Sep 20Dec 20Mar 21Jun 21Global1.32-124-23

57、1.141.101.091.091.08excluding US1.72-75-311.471.421.401.401.39Developed- 0.02-131-1-0.03-0.03-0.03-0.03-0.03Emerging3.42-120-582.962.872.832.852.82Latin America4.21-215-1423.262.952.792.792.79EMEA EM4.68-349-524.274.093.994.164.33EM Asia3.01-56-432.642.612.602.582.52The Americas0.85-219-210.700.660.

58、630.630.63United StatesFed funds0.25-225015 Mar 20 (-100bp)29 Apr 20On hold0.250.250.250.250.25CanadaO/N rate0.25-150027 Mar 20 (-50bp)15 Apr 20On hold0.250.250.250.250.25BrazilSELIC O/N3.75-275-5018 Mar 20 (-50bp)6 May 206 May 20 (-50bp)3.253.253.253.253.25MexicoRepo rate6.50-170-35020 Mar 20(-50bp

59、)14 May 20Apr 20 (-100bp)4.503.503.003.003.00ChileDisc rate0.50-250031 Mar 20 (-50bp)6 May 20On hold0.500.500.500.500.50ColombiaRepo rate3.75-50-10027 Mar 20 (-50bp)30 Apr 20Apr 20 (-50bp)2.752.752.752.752.75PeruReference1.25-150-2519 Mar 20 (-100bp)16 Apr 20Apr 20 (-25bp)1.001.001.001.001.00Europe/

60、Africa0.64-102-120.550.510.490.530.56Euro areaDepo rate- 0.50-10012 Sep 19 (-10bp)30 Apr 20On hold-0.50-0.50-0.50-0.50-0.50United King- domBank rate0.10-65019 Mar 20 (-15bp)7 May 20On hold0.100.100.100.100.10NorwayDep rate0.25-75-2520 Mar 20 (-75bp)7 May 20Apr 20 (-25bp)0.000.000.000.000.00SwedenRep