美银-全球经济展望：代价战争：增长放缓通胀走高-Global Economic Viewpoint：The toll war：lower growth,higher inflation-20260401

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GlobalEconomicViewpoint

Thetollwar:lowergrowth,higherinflation

BofAGOBALRESEARCHBofASE

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Tradingideasandinvestmentstrategiesdiscussedhereinmaygiverisetosignificantriskandarenotsuitableforallinvestors.Investorsshouldhaveexperienceinrelevantmarketsandthefinancialresourcestoabsorbanylossesarisingfromapplyingtheseideasorstrategies.

BofASecuritiesdoesandseekstodobusinesswithissuerscoveredinitsresearch

reports.Asaresult,investorsshouldbeawarethatthefirmmayhaveaconflictof

interestthatcouldaffecttheobjectivityofthisreport.Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.

Refertoimportantdisclosuresonpage45to47.

Thewardividendsofar:mildstagflation

Wereviseourglobaleconomicforecastsinlinewithournewcommoditiesforecaststoreflecttheeconomicimpactofthewarsofar.Onglobalgrowth,wereviseour2026

forecastdownwardby40bpto3.1%whilekeeping2027at3.4%.Onglobalinflation,wemarkupour2026forecastupby90bpto3.3%and2027by10bpto2.5%.This

staflationaryshockwillhaveafasterimpactoninflationthanongrowthandweexpectmonetarypolicyratestotightenonaverageabout30bpvsourpreviousprojections.

Weassumeoilpricesaround$100/bblfortherestof2026

WenowassumethewarendsbeforetheendofApril,andthusweadjusttoanew

baselineprojectionthatfactorsinasizeable4mnb/ddeficitin2Qfollowedbyan

averageof2.5mnb/ddeficitin2H26.Inthisnewbasecase,Brentwouldaverage

$92.50/bblin2026,withoilpricesaround$100/bblfortherestoftheyearand

converginglowerbelow$70/bblbyend-2027.Inafastde-escalationscenario,weseeBrentpricesaveraging$77.50/bblin2026.Incontrast,inourescalationscenario,wehaveoilpricesaveraging$130/bblfor2026,withapeakabove$150/bbl.

Thestagflationshockiswidespreadbutuneven

IntheUS,werevisegrowthdownby50bpto2.3%thisyear,withthedirectimpactfromthewaraccountingforabout3/4oftherevision.Forinflation,wehavean70bprevisiononheadlineandwenowexpectcorePCE30bphigherat3.1%byend-2026.IntheEuroarea,wemarkdowngrowthby60bpandraiseinflationforecastsby160bpto3.3%,withcoreat2.3%.Oilwilldriveupinflationswiftlyandelevatedgaspricesdeliverextra

persistence.InChina,inflationwouldlikelyremainlowat1%,andweexpectstrongexportsandpolicyresponsetobuffertheshocksothatitcouldstillachieve4.5%growth,amild20bpdownwardrevision.

Monetarypolicydivergenceremainsalive

WestillexpecttheFedtocutratesby50bpthisyear,butwepushbackcutsfrom

June/JulytoSeptember/Octoberandacknowledgehighrisksthatthesecutsmaynot

materialize.FortheECB,wenowexpect50bpofhikesinJuneandJuly,withacuttingcyclenextyear.Similarly,wealsoexpecttheBoEtodeliver50bphikesinJuneandJulytoinsureagainstsecondroundeffects.BoJappearstoprioritizegrowthoverinflation,andwekeepforecastsunchanged.InEM,ratehikesinAsiaappearcontainedrelativetothe80-100bphigherratesexpected,onaverage,inLatAmandEEMEA.

Escalationscenariosstillposemajorrisks

Theeconomyhasbecomelessoildependentovertime,buttheIranwarisnotonly

aboutoil.Itisabroad-basedenergyshock.Ifthewarescalatesandbecomesprotracted,thenon-linearconsequencesofmuchhigherenergyprices,coupledwithasignificant

correctioninassetpricescouldleadtheglobaleconomyintoarecessionaryscenario.Inourview,wearefarfromthatscenario,butthetailriskisfatterthancurrentlypricedin.

01April2026

EconomicsGlobal

TableofContents

Globalletter:Somedamagealreadydone2

US:Alittlestagflation,withrisksofalot8

Euroarea:Saltinastillunhealedwound12

China:Policyresponsemitigatestheshock15

Japan:Inflationriskovergrowthrisk17

UK:Risingtrade-offs19

Canada:Highergrowthandinflation22

Asia:Responsesagainststagflation23

EEMEA:Intheeyeofthestorm28

LatAm:Neutralwithdispersion35

Keyforecasts40

Detailedforecasts41

ResearchAnalysts48

ClaudioIrigoyen

GlobalEconomistBofAS

+16468551734

claudio.irigoyen@

AntonioGabriel

GlobalEconomistBofAS

AdityaBhave

USEconomistBofAS

CarlosCapistran

LatAmandCanadaEconomistBofAS

Jean-MichelSaliba

EEMEAEconHead/MENAEconomistMLI(UK)

RubenSegura-Cayuela

EuropeEconomist

BofAEurope(Madrid)

HelenQiao

China&AsiaEconomistMerrillLynch(HongKong)

PedroDiaz

CaribbeanEconomistBofAS

SeeTeamPageforListofAnalysts

2GlobalEconomicViewpoint|01April2026

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

Globalletter:Somedamagealreadydone

ClaudioIrigoyen

BofAS

AntonioGabriel

BofAS

Takingstockofthestagflationshock

AstheIranwarspillsoverintothesecondquarter,theprospectsdonotlookas

promisingassomerecentheadlinesmightsuggest.Despitesomesignsofwillingnesstode-escalatefromtheUSside,bothsidesstillappeartoofaraparttoreachastable

compromise,andescalationrisksarestillmeaningful.Inthisreport,weupdateour

globaleconomicforecaststoreflectourupdatedscenariosonthecommoditiesfront,asafunctionoftheevolutionoftheconflict.

Theforecastsdonottrytopredicttheoutcomeofthewarbutinsteadseektocaptureinparttheinevitabledamagetotheglobaleconomyevenundertheconstructive

assumptionofarelativelycontainedconflictasitwilltakeconsiderabletimetonormalizeenergyflowsandsupplychaindisruptions.

Globally,wearelookingata40bpdownwardrevisiontoglobalGDPgrowth,withan

90bpupwardrevisioninglobalinflationvsourpre-warforecasts,whilewenowexpecthigherpolicyrateswillalsobehigheronaverage(Exhibit1).ThisisconsistentwithastagflationaryshockthatwouldimpactinflationearlierandmoreprominentlythanGDPgrowth,basedonournewbasecasewithoilpricesremainingcloseto$100/bblfortherestof2026.

Theglobaleconomyhasbecomelessoildependentovertime,butifthewarescalates

andbecomesprotracted,wewouldmovetoamorebearishscenario.Inthiscase,non-

linearconsequencesofmuchhigherenergypricescouldbecomesignificant,negativelyaffectingassetpricesandexacerbatingtheeconomicimpactoftheoriginalshock.Ifthismorebearishscenarioweretomaterialize,therisksofaglobalgrowthslumpora

recessionintheUSwouldincreasesignificantly.Inourview,wearefarfromthatscenario,butthetailriskisfatterthancurrentlypricedin.

Exhibit1:Wenowexpectlessgrowthandmoreinflationin2026GDPgrowth,CPIinflationandmonetarypolicyratesforecasts(%)

GDPgrowth%CPIinflation%Monetarypolicyrate%

20252026F2027F20252026F2027F20252026F2027F

NewOldNewOldNewOldNewOldNewOldNewOld

Global3.53.13.53.43.42.43.32.42.52.43.743.643.343.423.22

DevelopedMarkets1.71.41.91.51.72.63.32.32.22.12.712.762.512.512.39

US2.12.32.82.22.12.73.62.82.32.53.6253.133.1253.133.125

Euroarea1.50.61.21.01.32.13.31.72.11.72.002.502.001.751.50

Japan1.10.40.70.60.83.22.11.62.62.20.751.251.251.751.75

EmergingMarkets4.74.24.64.54.52.33.32.52.72.64.414.203.863.993.73

EmergingMarketsexChina4.64.04.54.64.53.94.74.04.03.96.225.905.465.555.26

EmergingAsia5.54.85.15.15.10.92.41.52.02.02.722.802.582.882.73

China5.04.54.74.54.50.01.00.10.80.81.401.401.201.401.20

EmergingEMEA3.43.33.83.73.79.27.06.45.85.58.427.366.836.065.81

LatinAmerica2.42.32.32.42.23.74.73.93.93.68.598.047.257.686.81Source:BofAGlobalResearch,Haver

Note:GDPgrowthandCPIinflationforecastsareexpressedasyoyavg.Monetarypolicyratesareeop.OldforecastsasofFebruary27,2026.

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

NewscenariosfortheIranwar

Wetakestockoftheeconomicimplicationsofthewarincludinganupdatedbaseline

andalternativescenariosfromourCommoditiesteam(Exhibit2andreportGlobal

EnergyWeekly:Geopoliticsreshuffleworldenergyflowsagain).WenowassumethewarendsbeforetheendofAprilandthusweadjusttoanewbaselineprojectionthatfactorsinasizeable4mnb/ddeficitin2Qfollowedbyanaverageof2.5mnb/ddeficitin2H26.Inthisnewbasecase,Brentwouldaverage$92.50/bblin2026,withoilpricesaround

$100/bblfortherestoftheyearandconverginglowerbelow$70/bblbyend-2027.

GlobalEconomicViewpoint|01April20263

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

Inanalternativefastde-escalationscenario,whichweseeasunlikely,weseeamodestdeficitwithsupplynormalizingin2H,andwepencilinBrentaveraging$77.50/bblin

2026.Incontrast,inourescalationscenario,wehaveoilpricesaveraging$130/bblfor2026,withapeakabove$150/bbl.

Itisworthnoting,however,thatnoneofourthreescenariosassumetoday’slevelofdisruptions(14mnb/d)issustainedformorethansixweeksorthatitworsensasaresultofmilitarystrikesonthefewalternativeavailableroutes,whichmeansmoreextremealternativescenariosstillexist.

Exhibit2:WenowupdateourvariouspricescenariostoreflectthechangingnatureoftheIranwarOurthreescenariosandimplications

ScenarioFastde-

escalation

OilMarketImpact

Modest2Q26oildeficitreturningtoabalancedmarketin2H

2026BrentPrices$77.50/bbl

MainAssumptions

Essentiallythewarendsindaysandthemarketnormalizesin2H26

Likelihood

Unlikely

Baseline

Sizeable4mnb/ddeficitin2Qfollowedby1.7mnb/ddeficitsin2H26

$92.5/bbl

Thewarendsin2-4weeksasTrumpAdministrationhaveindicated

Likely

Escalation

Deficitsof7mnb/din2Qfollowedbymoremoderatedeficitsof2-3mnb/din2H26-$130/bbl

$130/bbl

Thewardeepensbutitendssometimein2Q,althoughflowstaketimetonormalise

Possible

Source:BofAGlobalResearch

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

Theanatomyoftheenergyshock

Theworldeconomyislessdependentonoil,butifanythinghasbecomewaymore

sensitivetonaturalgasandfertilizers,whichrepresentamajorriskforEuropeand

developingeconomiesrelativetotheUS(Exhibit3andExhibit4).Thisisanimportantdifferencerelativetopastoilshocks.Yes,theglobaleconomyislesssensitivetooilshocks,butitisnotonlyaboutoilanymore.TheIranwarisnotanoilshock–itisanenergyshock.Andittendstohitinflationearlierthanithitsgrowth.

Atermsoftradeandsupplyshockinthemaking

Anenergyshockhasanimpactoninflationandgrowththatfundamentallydependsonenergydependenceandsensitivity,financialfragility,andthepersistenceoftheshock.Thesameshockimpactsmorenegativelyonaggregateincomeforenergyimportingcountries,asthetermsoftradeshockactsasatransferfromenergyimportingto

energyexportingcountries.Forthatreason,theUSismoreinsulatedthanEurope,Korea,India,ChinaorJapantothesameshock.

Exhibit3:Theworldmaybelessdependentonoil…Oilbarrelsconsumptionper$1,000ofGDP

2

1.21

1.81.61.4

0.8

0.60.4

0.2

196519751985199520052015

——WorldUSChina——D.EuropeRoW

Source:BofAGlobalResearch,EnergyInstitute,Haver

Note:GDPisexpressedinconstant2015dollars.Oilbarrelsincludeliquidssuchasinternationalaviation,marinebunkers,biogasoline,biodieselandderivativesofcoalandnaturalgas.

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

Exhibit4:…buttheIranwarisnotjustanoilshockOil,naturalgas,andfertilizerprices

201820192020202120222023202420252026

BrentFertilizers(Index)NaturalGas(rhs)

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Source:BofAGlobalResearch,Bloomberg

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

4GlobalEconomicViewpoint|01April2026

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

Moreenergysensitivecountriesaremoreheavilyimpacted.Sinceenergymarketsareinterconnectedandindirectlyimpactfoodprices,developingcountrieswithhigherfoodandenergysharesintheirconsumptionbasketsaremoreexposedtotheenergyshock.

Sincegasisusedmoreheavilythancoalasaninputforelectricitygeneration,thisisanothertransmissionchanneloffirstorderimportanceforEuropeandSoutheastAsia.

Anenergyshockisasupplyshockwithhugeimpactonrelativeprices.Asthepricesof

energy-intensivegoodsandinputsincrease,itactsasataxonconsumersandcompanies,whichreducesrealincomeandprofits,hitsthespendingandinvestmentcapacity,and

putsdownwardpressureontherestofthegoodsandservicesintheeconomy.

However,giventhestickinessofnominalprices,italsoshowsupashigherinflation,whichinevitablyleadmarketstopriceintightermonetarypolicyandfinancial

conditions,puttingdownwardpressureoneconomicactivity.

Financialfragilityandpersistencecomeintoplay

Hereiswherefinancialfragilitycomesintoplay.Moreleveragedeconomiescomeintofinancialstressmorequickly.Thisisparticularlyimportanttocomparethisenergyshockvspreviousonesfordevelopedeconomieswithlimitedroomforfiscalstimulusand

moreleverageintheprivatesector,asisthecaseoftheUSandUK.

Finally,persistenceoftheshockiskey.Eventhoughwetendtothinkofsupplyshocksasstagflationaryinnature,thatishigherinflationandlowergrowth,thesequencingoftheimpactoftheshockisafunctionofhowtemporaryvspermanenttheshockisaswellastheexpectedsizeoftheshock.

Frominflationtogrowthshock

Energyshockstendtoimpactinflationquickly,ashigherinputcostsarepassedthrough.

Sinceusuallythesewar-drivenshocksareperceivedastemporaryatthebeginning,consumerspendingisquiteinelastic,somarketsclearthroughhigherpricesand

economicactivityisnotheavilyimpacted.

Oncetheshockisexpectedtohaveamorepersistenteffect,consumerandbusiness

confidencedrops,companiesadjustproductionlower,layoffsstart,andaggregate

spendingbecomesmoreelastictoprices.Thisiswhentheshocksmorphsfromapurelysupplyshockintoademandshockandeconomicactivityismoreimpactedwhile

inflationstartstopeak.

InthecaseoftheUS,excessiveleverageinsomesectors(startingwithgovernmentdeficits)andnegativewealtheffectsasfinancialandrealassetsrepriceintoamorepermanentshock,couldexacerbatethedropinaggregatespending.

Takingstockofthegrowthandinflationshocks

Overall,wearelookingata40bpdownwardrevisiontoglobalGDPgrowth,witha90bpupwardrevisioninglobalinflationvsourpre-warforecasts.Thisisconsistentwitha

stagflationaryshockthatwethink,inthebasecase,willimpactinflationearlierandmoreprominentlythanGDPgrowth.

US:somestagflation,butstillaroundpotential

IntheUS,werevisegrowthdownby50bpfor2026to2.3%,andweincreaseour

growthforecastslightlyby10bpto2.2%toreflectsomepaybackofdecliningoilpricesinto2027.Thebulkofourdownwardrevisionisduetoconsumerspendingandbusinessinvestment,bothofwhichshouldbenegativelyimpactedbyhigheroilprices.

Itisworthnoting,however,thatourrevisiontogrowthcapturesboththeoilpriceshockandamark-to-market,withthedirectimpactfromthewaraccountingforaround3/4ofthetotalrevision.Ona4Q/4Qbasis,wenowlookforgrowthtocomeinat2.2%.and

2.3%forend-2026and2027,respectively.

GlobalEconomicViewpoint|01April20265

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

WenowforecastheadlinePCEinflationtopeakin2Q2026at3.8%andtoremain70bpaboveourpriorforecastfortherestofthisyear.Weexpectheadlineinflationfalls

quicklynextyear,asoilretraces.Butweprojectpricelevelsattheendofnextyeartobe30bpaboveourpriorforecast,capturinghigherfoodinflationandsomelastingimpactonglobalsupplychains.Thesurgeinenergypricesislikelytopassthroughtocore

inflationaswell,withalag.Wenowexpect4Q/4Q2026corePCEtocomeinat3.1%,vs.2.8%previously.Coreinflationcouldreach2.5%in2027,abitsofterthanwewereexpectingearlier.

Euroarea:Moreacutefrombothangles

IntheEuroarea,weraiseinflationby160bpto3.3%thisyearandby40bpin2027to2.1%,withcoreat2.3%and2.2%,respectively.Oilwilldriveupinflationswiftlyandourassumptionthatelevatedgaspriceswillbelastingdeliversextrapersistence.Inflationundershootgetsdelayeduntil2H27Eforheadline,end-27Eforcore,butremainsakeyfeatureofouroutlook.Forgrowth,wecutourEuroareaforecaststo0.6%thisyearand1.0%next,from1.2%and1.3%,respectively,accountingforamorepersistentshock.

China:Morepolicyroomtoweathertheshock

Asanetenergyimporter,ChinaisbracingforthenegativemacroimpactoftheenergyshockfromtheMiddleEastconflict.Bypayingmuchhigherpricesforitsoil,LNG,andpetrochemicalimports,Chinawilllikelywitnessagrowthhitthroughterms-of-trade

losses.However,weexpectChinatobuffertheshockwiththehelpofstrongexportsandpolicyresponsesothatitcouldstillachieve4.5%growthin2026and2027,amild20bpdownwardrevisiontoourforecasts.

OurnewCPIinflationforecastsforChinastandat1.0%(+90bp)in2026and0.8%(flat)in2027.ButChina’sinitialconditionstocushiontheenergyshockaredifferentfrom

mostoftheworld.WithinflationclosetozeroandwellbelowthePBoCtargetof2.0%duetoweakdomesticdemandandindustrialovercapacity,policyspaceislarger.

JapanandtheUKarenotinagoodplace

InJapan,thegovernmentissettofootthebillandabsorbenergy‑drivenpricepressuresthroughfiscalmeasures,limitingtheimpactoninflationandgrowth.Wemarkup

inflationby50bpthisyearand40bpin2027,to2.1%and2.6%,respectively.For

growth,wecutourforecastsby30bpthisyear,to0.4%in2026,andby20bpnextyearto0.6%,astheinflationaryimpactofhigherenergypricesislikelytoweighon

householdconsumptionandcapex.Inaddition,demandsofteningacrossmajortradingpartners,shoulddampenexportgrowth.

IntheUK,stagflationcreatesatoughtradeoff.Wecutgrowthto0.6%in2026andto

1.1%in2027.Higherinflationislikelytosqueezerealincomesandconsumercautionislikelytoriseamidanotherpriceshockandweaklabormarket.Inaddition,wedon't

expectthefiscalresponsetobeasforcefulasin2022,giventhelimitedfiscalspace.Weraiseinflationby120bpto3.5%in2026,withinflationpeakingat4.1%inQ4.Wealsoraise2027inflationby50bpto2.5%onaverage,butexpecttoreachthetargetbyend-2027.

EMex-China:Differentiationdrivenbytermsoftradeshocks

Forotheremergingmarkets,ournewforecastsreflectadownwardrevisiontogrowthofabout50bp,concentratedin2026,withthecorrespondingincreaseininflationofabout70bponaverageforthesameperiod.However,notallregionsareequallyaffected,asistypicalamongemergingmarketsfacingtermsoftradeshocks.

Inparticular,weexpectLatAmtoberesilienttothegrowthshock,withmanycommodityexportersbenefittingonnet.However,theregionwillnotescapetheincreasein

inflation,aswenowprojectinflationtobe90bpaboveourpriorforecaststhisyear.

6GlobalEconomicViewpoint|01April2026

BofAGLOBALRESEARCH

Monetarypolicydivergenceremainsalive

Inournewbasecase,wehaveourglobalaverageofmonetarypolicyrateshigherbyabout30bp,reflectingthestagflationarynatureoftheforecastchanges.However,westillexpectsomemonetarypolicydivergenceahead.

WedelayFedcuts,withrisksofnocuts

WestillexpecttheFedtocutratesby50bpthisyear,butwepushbackcutsfrom

June/JulytoSeptember/October,andacknowledgehighrisksthatthesecutsmaynot

materialize.WehaveconsistentlybeenoftheviewthattheUSeconomydoesnotneedtheratecutswewerepenciingin,butthatachangeofleadershipintheFedmadethemmorelikelythannot.Thecurrentshockundoubtedlymakesratecutslesslikelyinthe

shortterm,butwethinktheymaymaterializelaterintheyear.

CentralbanksinEuropebecomemorehawkish

FortheECB,wenowexpect25bpratehikesinJuneandJuly2026toadeporateof

2.50%.Risksaretiltedtoanearlier(April)oronemoremove.Wethinkcutswillfollowin2027,quarterlyandstartinginJune,withaterminalrateatorbelow1.5%in2028,ifnotearlier.Similarly,wenowexpecttheBoEtodelivertohikesinJuneandJuly2026asaninsurancetoguardagainstsecondroundeffects.ButwethenexpectthreequarterlycutsfromQ22027.

Thishawkishturnislikelytospillovertothesmallercentralbankstoo.TheRiksbankismoreforward‑lookingthantheECB,andwedonotexpectittomoveintorestrictive

territory.Thatsaid,asinglehikebackto2.0%(i.e.neutral)inJunelooksmorelikelythannot.NorgesBankfacesaclearerinflationchallenge:whileNOKstrengthwillhelp,we

nowexpectthemtohikeinJunetoo,withrisksskewedtowardsadditionaltightening.

TheBoJisalwaysanexception

TheBoJcouldbeanexception,inpartbecausehikeswereexpectedtobeginwith.We

continuetoexpecttheBoJtohike50bpthisyearand50bpnextyear.Butthisis

unchangedvsourpreviousforecasts,reflectingtheBoJprioritizinggrowthoverinflationrisks,ashasbeenmadeclearbymanyontheBoard.

HigherratesinEmergingMarkets

WeexpectthePBoCtoremainonthesidelines,despitehavingpolicyroom.InEMAsia,weexpectpolicyratestobesomewhathigheronaveragevsourpreviousforecasts,butaswasthecasewiththeCOVIDshock,notmanyratehikeswouldbeexpected.In

contrast,weexpecthigherpolicyratesinEMEAandLatAm,withmonetarypolicytighteningbyabout50bponaverageinEEMEAand75bpinLAtAm.

Aremarketsoverfocusedoninflation?

Thereisthisnarrativethatmarketsaretoofocusedoninflationwhileignoringtheimpactoftheenergyshockoneconomicactivity.Yes,marketsarepricinghigher

inflationandtightermonetarypolicythanfiveweeksago.Butthisisnotevidenceofmispricedfundamentals.

Instead,itisasimplereflectionofthemarket’sexpectationofaquickresolutiontothewar.Inotherwords,theexpectationthattheshockwillbetemporaryandlimitedinsize,withatemporaryincreaseininflationthatcouldforcetheFedtoremainonholdanditwouldnotbepersistentenoughtocreatesignificantdestructionofeconomicactivity.

Marketsmightbeoverlyoptimisticabouttheoutcomeofthewar.Butthepricingisconsistentwiththeconsensusviewthatthewarwillberelativelyshort-livedand

eventuallyenergypriceswillstarttonormaliz