汇丰-全球宏观策略师：重启希望犹存动荡仍是现实-HSBC Global Macro Strategist：Reopening hopes,disruption reality-20260507

HSBCGicbalinvestmentResearch7May2026

THISCONTENTMAYNOTBEDISTRIBUTEDTOMAINLANDCHINA

Multi-Asset

Global

HSBCGlobalMacroStrategist

Reopeninghopes,disruptionreality

uMarketsarehopefulforadealandpriceinonlyatemporaryinflationhumpfromtheMiddleEastconflict

uAsrawmaterialinventoriesapproachatippingpoint,tousitallboilsdowntohowquicklyHormuztrafficcouldnormalise

uAswiftreopeningwouldsupportrisk,butwearewaryoftheloftylevelsandfocusonthelaggards;adelayedreopeningwouldaddtonotonlyinflationbutalsogrowthrisks

GlobalMacroStrategistcombinesthebesttradeideasofHSBCstrategistsacrossassetclassesandregions,tosubscribeplease

clickhere

.

Anatomyofasupply-sideshock

AstheMiddleEastconflictisstillrumblingon,marketsarehopefulforadealbased

onthelatestnewsflow(BBG,06May2026).However,whatreallyultimatelymattershasnotchangedsinceourpreviousreportposttheceasefireannouncement

(Latest

ongeopolitics:de-escalationandtakingstock

,8April2026):TheStraitisstill

closedatthetimeofwritingandtheworldeconomyisdeprivedofcriticalrawmaterialsonanenormousscalewithinventoriesshrinkingeverypassingday.

Marketshavesofarpricedinarathertemporaryinflationimpactbasedonthe

repricingofmonetarypolicyexpectationsforthisyear.Ouroil&gasteamhasalsorevisedtheir2026averageBrentoilforecasthighertoUSD95/b

(Oilmarkets

,6May2026),whiletheglobaleconomicoutlookisnowborderingthe“badscenario”laidoutbyourglobaleconomists(

GlobalEconomicsQuarterly

,25March2026).

Whathaschangedrecentlyisthereactionoftheglobalcentralbanks;someare

hiking(Australia,Philippines,Norway),someareadoptingahawkishtone(ECB,BoE)

andsomeareseeingdissentingvoicestoadovishbias(theFed).Atanyrate,theglobalcentralbanksarereadyingtoactfurtheriftheyweretoseetheenergyandbroader

commodityshock(includingagriculturalprices)spillingoverintoinflationexpectations

and/orunderlyinginflation.Areweonthevergeofaglobaltighteningcycle?OnceagainitalldependsonhowquicklytheStraitofHormuztrafficisnormalisedincaseofa

deal.Aswiftreopeningwouldlikelysupportriskassets,althoughwearewaryoftheloftylevelspostAprilrally,hencewouldfocusonthelaggardsinourtrades.

Meanwhile,acomplicatedanddelayedreopeningofthestraitwouldnowaddtonotonlyinflationrisksbutalsogrowthrisksthathavenotbeendiscountedatallsofar.Yes,corporateandhouseholdbalancesheetsareinagoodshapetostartwith,techearningsarestillliftedbyAIgainsandcostsavings,andfiscalpolicyhasbeencalledfordutytomitigatethesupplysqueezeirrespectiveofthefiscalspace.Nonetheless,withinventoriesdrawndownsignificantlysincethestartoftheconflictanyfurther

leakagewouldlikelybringustothetippingpointsasarguedbyourcommodity

economists

(CommodityPricesSnapshot

,4May2026).Wepresenttradesfora

scenarioofcomplicated-delayedreopeningwhichwouldcallforfreshupsideriskstoinflationanddownsideriskstogrowth,alongsidelikelycentralbankaction.

Swiftreopening

MarketEquity

GlobalEM

OutperformanceofAsia-EuropeanequitiesOWEMequities

Market

Credit

US/Europe

HYoutperformsIG

Market

FX&PreciousMetals

USD

EM

Inasoftorbit

High-yieldEMcarry

Market

Rates

DM

EM

Re-steepeningwithratehikesbeingfadedandfocusshiftingbacktofiscal

EMlocaldebtoutperformsEMcredit

Complicated-delayedreopening

Market

Equity

GlobalEM

EM

US,LatAmrelativeoutperformanceOWmainlandChina,Taiwan,BrazilUWIndia,Indonesia

Market

Credit

US

Underweight30yIG

EuropeEM

Overweightsingle-AsPreferEMEXDtoLCD

Market

FX&PreciousMetals

US,China

USDstaysrelativelyfirm,RMBresilient

China/Europe

SellEUR-CNH

Thailand/Korea

SellTHB-KRW1mDF/NDF

Asia

SGDversusTHB,PHP,IDR,INR

LatAm

LatAmFXoutperforms

Gold

Staylonggold/preciousmetals

Market

Rates

US

Sell5YUSTonASW

Japan

Pay30YJPYOIS

Europe&UK

Curvesflattenandeventuallyinvert

MainlandChina

Buy30YCGB

India

PayINR5YNDOIS

Korea

Rec1Y1YKRWNDIRS

Thailand

THB10-5YNDOISsteepener

SouthAfrica

SellSAGB2035onASW

Poland

BuyPOLGB1.75%2031linker

*Seethetradeideastableattheendandlinkstorelevantproductstostayupdatedonanyclosedtradeideas.Source:HSBC

Dr.MuratUlgen

GlobalHeadofMacroStrategy

HSBCBankplc

muratulgen@

+442079916782

Disclosures&Disclaimer

ThisreportmustbereadwiththedisclosuresandtheanalystcertificationsintheDisclosureappendix,andwiththeDisclaimer,whichformspartofit.

Issuerofreport:HSBCBankplc

ViewHSBCGlobalInvestmentResearchat:

Multi-Asset●Global

https://www

HSBC

7May2026

2

Riskassetrecoupedtheirlosses,buttheStraitof

Hormuzremainsclosed

…puttingpressurenotonlyonoil&gaspricesbuton

broadercommoditycomplex

Marketshavesofarfocusedmostlyontheinflation

consequences…

…whichledtoasharp

adjustmentofinflationand

monetarypolicyexpectations

Thisisstillasupply-sideshock

IthasbeenmorethantwomonthssincetheMiddleEastconflictescalated,andmarketshavestartedtolookthroughsomeoftheimmediatestress.Riskassetsacrossbothdevelopedandemergingmarketshaverecoveredmuchoftheirearlierlosses,supportedbytheceasefire

announcementandgrowinghopesofamoredurabletruce,mostrecentlybasedonthereportsthatIranandtheUSareclosetoadeal(Bloomberg,6May2026).

Thatreliefisunderstandable.Acredibleandlastingagreementwouldreducetailrisks,easesomepressureonenergymarkets,andgivebothinvestorsandpolicymakersmorebreathingspace.Butthekeymacroissueisnotfullyresolvedyet.TheStraitofHormuzremains

effectivelyclosed,withflowsofoil,gasandothercommoditiesfromtheregionstillmateriallyimpaired.Untilphysicalflowsnormaliseinadurableway,theepisoderemainsabroader

supply-sideshockratherthansimplyanoil-priceshock.

Thisiswhyouroil&commoditiesteamhaverevisedtheiraverageBrentoilassumptionshigherforasecondtime

1

.BasedontheassumptionthattherewouldbeanagreementinJuneand

nearnormalsystem-levelproductionandflowsbyend3Q26,theteamseesBrentprices

averagingUSD95/bin2026(c40%higherthan2025average),andUSD75/bin2027.Thatsaid,theteamalsohighlightstwoalternativescenarios,bothofwhichassumemuchhigheraverageoilprices(aboveUSD100/b)iftheopeningoftheStraitisdelayedtothesecondhalfoftheyear.

Clearly,oilpricesarethemostvisibletransmissionchannel,buttheyarenottheonlyone

2

.TheStraitisalsoanimportantrouteforgas,fertilisers,industrialinputs,andotherenergy-intensivecommodities.Disruptioncanthereforespreadbeyondcrudeintotransportcosts,foodprices

3

,supplychains,corporatemargins,andeventuallyactivity.Theshockhasalreadybroadened

beyondenergyalone

4

,withtheglobaloutlookdependingheavilyonhowactivityholdsupashighercostsandrestrictedsupplyfeedthrough.

Inflationfirst

Marketshavesofarfocusedmostlyontheinflationconsequences,whichisbroadlyunderstandable.Attheendoftheday,theimpactofhigherenergypricesisimmediatelyvisibleonheadlineinflation

5

.

Higheroil,gas,diesel,jetfuel,fertiliser,andfreightcostshavealreadyledtoasharpspikein

Marchinflationfigures,andtheannouncedCPIprintssofarforAprilsuggestthattheimpact

hasbecomeevenmorepronounced,withsomesignificantupsidesurpriseinheadlineinflationinthelikesofthePhilippines

6

,Thailand

7

andTürkiye,eventhoughcorporatesbroadlycontinuetorefrainfromfullyreflectingrisingcostsidepricepressuresforthetimebeing.

Meanwhile,therehasbeenquiteasharpadjustmentofinflationexpectationsaswell,whichalsoledtosomevisiblerepricingofmonetarypolicy,withinvestorsexpectingfewerratecuts,more

hawkishcentralbankcommunication,andinsomecases,reneweddiscussionofratehikes.

Thatrepricinghasalreadybeensignificant.Front-endrateshaveadjusted,long-endyieldshavebeenpulledhigherbyfiscalandinflationconcerns,andcentralbankshavebecomemore

cautious.Somehavealreadymovedinamorehawkishdirection;othershavesignalledthat

theyarepreparedtoactifhigherenergyandcommoditypricesspilloverintoinflation

expectationsorunderlyinginflation.Attheendoftheday,centralbanksdonotneedtobelievetheshockispermanenttoreact.Theyonlyneedtoworrythatitlastslongenoughtoimpact

expectations,influencewage-settingbehaviourorcausesecond-roundeffects.

1

OilMarkets:HigherforlongerasHormuzdisruptiondrags-Raisingpriceforecasts,

6May2026

2

HSBCGlobalMacroStrategist:Latestongeopolitics:de-escalationandtakingstock,

8April2026

3

Alotontheplate:Couldfoodinflationbethenextcostshock?,

28April2026

4

CommodityEconomicComment:Hormuzstillclosed:BewareStraitnon-linearities,

28April2026

5

Inflationreawakens:Thekeymacrochartsasconflictrumbleson,

5May2026

6

PhilippineCPI:It'stheclimb,

5May2026

7

ThailandCPI:Pressurevalve,

6May2026

3

Centralbankscouldlook

throughashort-livedspikeininputcosts

Iftheshockweretolinger,policywouldlikelyneedtotightenratherforcefully

Fed’sdualmandate

complicatesitsresponsetothecostshock

Economicactivityhasstayedresilientsincetheconflict

…ascarryoverwas

supportiveamidstronggrowthmomentum

Centralbankscannotlookthrougheverything

Thisiswhyinflationpricingtradesshouldnotbefadedtooearly.Ashort-livedoilspikecouldbelookedthrough.Abroadersupplyshockishardertoignore.Theproblemisthatthisshockis

pullingthegrowth-inflationmixinoppositedirections,ashigherinputcostspushinflationup,whileweakerrealincomesandconfidencepullgrowthdown.

Policyhasn’tshiftedtobroad-basedtighteningyet,asidefromclearmovesinthePhilippines,

Pakistan,AustraliaandNorway.Thatsaid,theeasingnarrativehasfaded:ourglobalpolicyrate

diffusionindexturnedpositiveinAprilforthefirsttimeinnearlythreeyears,indicatingthatthereweremorecentralbanksraisingratesthancuttingthem.Ifthecostshockprovesrelativelyshort-lived,corecentralbanks,includingEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)andBankofEngland(BoE)maystillstayonhold,butwithabias(tovaryingdegrees)towardshikesratherthancuts.Inamoreadversescenario,policywouldlikelyneedtotightenmoreforcefully,particularlyincontinentalEurope,whiletheFed’s

dualmandatemakesitsresponselessstraightforward,althoughthebiasmayshift.

TheECB’sratesettingmeetingfromAprilisacaseinpoint,wheretheBankkeptthedeposit

rateunchangedat2.00%inAprilbutexplicitlyacknowledgedtheupsideriskstoinflationand

downsideriskstogrowth.PresidentLagardealsosignalledthat(10th-11th)JuneMPCwouldbeaverylivemeetingintermsofratehikes

8

.TheBoEalsofacesthesametrade-off,andtheBankhasan‘activehold’stanceratherthana‘passivewait-and-see’position

9

.

Meanwhile,theFedisdifferent,butnotimmune.TheAprilFOMCleftratesunchangedat3.50–3.75%,butthreepolicymakersobjectedtoretainingtheeffectiveeasingbiasinthestatement

andshowedpreferencetomodifytheFOMC’sforwardguidanceinahawkishdirection

10

.

Formarkets,thismattersintwoways.First,thefrontendcanremainvulnerableifinflationdataorinputcostsforcecentralbankstokeepmovingawayfromeasing.IntheUS,thehawkishtiltaftertheFOMCwasenoughtopush2-yrTreasuryyieldsmorethan10bphigherintraday,withimpliedeasingbeingpricedout.Second,reducedvisibilityoncentral-bankguidancecanraisetermpremiafurtheroutthecurve,especiallyifinvestorsdemandmorecompensationfor

uncertaintyaroundthepolicypath.

Thebroadermessageisthatcentralbanksarenotyetfullybackintighteningmode,butthey

arenolongercomfortablyretaininganeasingbiaseither.Ifthecostshockfadesquickly,they

maybeabletostayonholdandallowtighterfinancialconditionstodosomeofthework.Butifthedisruptionpersists,thepolicydebateshiftsfromwhethercentralbankscanlookthroughthisshocktohowmuchtighteningisneededtopreventsecond-roundeffects,eventhoughthere

mightbesomeconsequencesontheactivityfrontaswell.

Growthrisksunderestimated

EconomicactivityhasremainedbroadlyresilientsincetheMiddleEastconflictescalated,and

wethinkdownsidegrowthrisksarestillnotfullypriced.Riskassetshavereboundedfromthe

initialshock,supportedbytheceasefireandrenewedhopesofabroaderdeal.Moreover,

resilientQ1earnings,AI-relatedoptimismandongoingfiscalsupporthavehelpedwiththe

overallsentiment,whileadrawdownincommodityinventorieshelpedwiththenear-termgrowthoutlook(althoughstocklevelsarenowbecomingthininsomeareas).Inotherwords,markets

havetreatedtheconflictas(temporarily)inflationary,butnotyetasmeaningfullyrecessionary.

Therearereasonsforthis.Theglobaleconomyenteredtheshockwithasizeablecarryover

fromlastyear,andthemomentumwasalreadystrong.Thecorporateandhouseholdbalance

sheetswerestrongtostartwith,theAIinvestmentcyclewassupportiveofequitymarkets

11

,andgovernmentsannouncedcertainmeasurestocushionsomeofthehittohouseholdsand

______________________________________

8

ECBMeeting(Apr):UnanimousholdinApril,bigdecisioninJune,

30April2026

9

BoEDecision(Apr2026):Anactivehold,

30April2026

10

FOMCMulti-AssetDirection:EndofthePowellera,

29April2026

11

TheAIdivide:growthvsdisruption,

4May2026

4

Buttheseoffsetsmayonly

buytimeasapersistent

shockwouldactlikeataxonconsumersandfirms

Growthriskpricingmaybethe‘tradeafterthetrade’

Theshockisbroaderthan

crudeoilandwehavealreadyseensomesignificantprice

increasesacrossmanycommodities

Governmentscantryto

cushiontheimpact,butthereisacostandalimit

Thefalloutdiffersacrossregions&economies…

…EuropeandmuchofAsiahaveseenabiggerimpact

Acredibleagreementwouldclearlyreducetheimmediatetailriskformarkets

companies.Thesefactorshavehelpedinvestorslookthroughtheimmediategrowthdamage,alongsidethecarry-forwardeffectofdemandandproductionbeforepricesstarttorise

12

.

Buttheseoffsetsmayonlybuytime.Apersistentenergyandsupplychainshockactlikeatax

onconsumersandfirms.Itreducesrealdisposableincome,raisesinputcosts,squeezes

margins,delaysinvestmentandtightensfinancialconditions.Thelongerthedisruptionlasts,thecloserwemightgettotheso-called《tippingpoints刊ininventories

13

andthemorelikelythe

attentionwouldmovefrominflationworrytogrowthconcerns.

Thetradeafterthetrade

lnthatsense,inflationpricinghasbeenthefirsttrade,andgrowthriskpricingmaybetheítradeafterthetrade’.Therearethreereasonswhygrowthcomplacencymaynotlastincaseof

protractedHormuzStraitclosure.

First,theshockcouldprovemorepersistentthanmarketsexpect.Currentoilfuturespricingstillpointstoarelativelyswiftnormalisationinprices,eventhoughthesupplylossiscomparabletothe1970s.Ourcalculationssuggestsupply-drivenoilshockstendtolastlongerthantypicaloilpricespikes,withanestimatedhalf-lifeofaround6.4monthsduringsupply-drivenepisodes

14

.

Second,theshockisbroaderthancrudeoil.We’vealreadyseensignificantpriceincreasesnotonlyinoilderivatives–suchasdieselandjetfuel–butalsoinureaandfertiliser,aswellas

shippingandairfreightcosts.Thesearekeyinputsintotransport,food,manufacturingand

globaltrade.Ifdisruptionpersists,whatstartsasanenergypressurecanbecomeawidercostandsupplychainshock,particularlyforeconomieswithhighenergyimportdependenceor

meaningfulexposuretoGulfrawmaterialflows.

Third,policysupportisn’tfree.Governmentscantrytocushionhouseholdsandfirms,butfiscalspaceistighterthanitwasin2022.PublicfinancesarealreadystretchedacrossmajorDMandEMeconomies,andadditionalsupportcouldaddfurtherpressuretolong-termratesandrisk

premia.Thatcreatesadifficultpolicymix:fiscalsupportmaysoftenthenear-termgrowthhit,butitcanalsoworsendebtconcernsandkeeplong-endyieldsunderpressure,makingdirectional

curvetradesverydifficult.

Notallshocksareequal

True,theglobalimpactofthecurrentísupplysqueeze’willnotbeevenlydistributed.Energy

exportersoutsidetheimmediateconflictzonemaybenefitfromhigherprices,thoughtheyarenotimmunetoweakerglobaldemandand/ortighterfinancialconditions.Energyimportersfaceamoredifficultmix,thoughit’simportanttomakethedistinctionbetweenthosethatwouldbeimpactedthroughpriceandvolumechannels.

EuropeandmuchofAsiaarelikelytobemorevulnerabletothetermsoftradeshock,where

importedenergyandgasexposurearehigh.TheUShasmoredomesticenergyproductionandtheAIcapexcycleplustaxrebateareimportantoffsets.Thatsaid,highergasoline/dieselpricesstillactasadragonconsumers,especiallylower-incomehouseholds.EMmorebroadlyshouldnotbetreatedasoneblock,thoughit’sLatAmthatseemstoberelativelymoreinsulatedonanaggregatebasis.

What’sthestrategy?

Thelatestnewsflowhasincreasedhopesofadeal,andacredibleagreementwouldclearly

reducetheimmediatetailriskformarkets.IftheStraitofHormuzreopensswiftlyandphysical

flowsnormalise,inflationhedgeswouldlikelygivebacksomegains,central-bankrepricingcouldease,andriskassetscouldextendtheirrecovery.Inthatscenario,equities,credit,EMFXand

carrytradeswouldlikelybenefit,particularlywheretheAprilreboundhasbeenlesspronounced.

_______________________________________________

12

India:Acaseofmanufacturingfront-loading:AprilPMIFlash'sintriguingrise,

23April2026

13

CommodityPricesSnapshot,

4May2026

14

GEMsInvestor:Resiliencetest,

20April2026

5

Thestrategyistorespectthereliefrally,butnotchaseit

indiscriminatelyincaseofaswiftreopening

Delayedreopeningwouldaddnotonlytoinflationbutalsotogrowthrisks

Therefore,thestrategyistorespectthereliefrally,thoughnotchaseitindiscriminately.Whatmattersformarketsisnotonlywhetheradealisannounced,butwhetherthereopeningoftheStraitisfast,credibleandoperationallysmooth.Inventorieshavealreadybeendrawndown,

andthelongertrafficremainsimpaired,thegreatertheriskthattheshockmovesbeyonda

temporaryinflationimpulseintoamorepersistentgrowth-inflationproblem.Thatisthepointatwhichmarketsmayneedtomovefrompricinginflationrisktopricinggrowthriskaswell.

Witheverypassingdayofthestraitbeingclosed,marketsmightmoveawayfrominflationriskpricingtogrowthriskpricing.Thatwouldbeamoredifficultenvironmentforriskassets,andthepeckingorderofassetclassperformanceswouldlikelyreverse,i.e.ratesanddurationwould

takethecentrestageandgrowth-sensitiveassetssuchasFX,credit,andequitieswould

underperform,ifnottakeahit.AstheUSwouldcontinuetooutperformgivenitsself-reliance,thismightevenbringbackUSexceptionalismtradewithUSDgainingtheupperhand.

Inthisedition,wepresentourbesttradeideasforboth“swiftreopening”and“complicated-delayedreopening”oftheStraitofHormuz.

Multi-Asset●.Global

https://www

HSBC

7May2026

6

Marketspriceinatemporaryinflationhump

1.Spikeinoilhasbroughtstagflationrisks

backintofocus

125

115

105

95

85

75

65

55

202120222023202420252026

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Oil(USD/bbl)Stagflation:Newsstorycount

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

3.Higherinflationexpectationshavealreadybeenreflectedinforecasts…

Jul-25Oct-25Jan-26Apr-26

DMEM(RHS)

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

3.2%

3.1%

3.0%

2.9%

2.8%

2.7%

2.6%

3.7%

3.5%

3.3%

3.1%

2.9%

2.7%

ConsensusCPIgrowthforecasts(2026)

5.Futuressuggestsomenormalisationinoilpriceslaterthisyear…

150

120

90

60

30

0

-30

-60

-90

15161718192021222324252627

135

120

105

90

75

60

45

30

15

y-o-y%*Brent(USD/b,RHS)*

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg.Note:*Dashedlineisbasedonfuturespricing.

2.…giventhecloserelationshipbetween

energycostsandpricepressures

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

12131415161718192021222324252627

Oilprices(%y-o-y)USPPI(%y-o-y,RHS)EMPPI(%y-o-y,RHS)

30

20

10

0

-10

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg,LSEGDatastream.Note:Dashedlineisbasedonfuturespricing.

4.…andmarketpricing

3.65.0Inflationswap(%)

3.3

4.5

3.0

2.74.0

2.4

2.13.5

1.8

3.0

1.5

1.22.5Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-26

EUR2-yrUS2-yrUK2-yr(RHS)

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

6.…butthistendstotakemuchlongerfollowingasupplyshock

150

135

120

105

90

75

60

45

30

15

0

979901030507091113151719212325

Brent(USD/b)Trend

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

Multi-Asset●Global

https://www

HSBC

7May2026

7

7.It’snotjustanoilstory,withdisruption

tofertilisers

50%

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

PhosphateUreaAmmoniaPotashSulphurMiddleEastshareofglobal:ProductionExports

Source:S&PGlobalCommodityInsights,HSBC

8.…andhelium,whichcouldposearisktotheproductionofsemiconductors

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

USQatarRussiaOthersAlgeria

Globalheliumproduction

Source:HSBC,USGS.Note:Datais2025.

9.Thesurgeinenergyfeedsthroughintohigherinputprices…

80

75

70

65

60

55

50

45

40

050709111315171921232527

S&PGSCIEnergySpotIndex(%y-o-y)

GlobalmanufacturingPMI:inputprices(index,RHS)

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg,S&PGlobal.Note:Dashedlineisbasedonunchangedenergyspotindex.

11.PolicyrateexpectationsinDM...

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

-150

-200

-250

17181920212223242526

USpolicyrateexpectationsin12m(3mchange,bps)Brentcrude(3mchange,RHS)

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

-20%-40%

-60%

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

10.…whichareyettobefullyreflectedinhigheroutputprices

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

-10

-12

1214161820222426

GlobalmfgPMIs:Outputpricesminusinputprices

Source:HSBC,S&PGlobal.

12.…andEMtendtorespondtospikesinoil

200100%

15075%

10050%

5025%

00% -50-25%-100-50%

-150-75%

17181920212223242526

EMpolicyrateexpectationsin12m(3mchange,bps) Brentcrude(3mchange,RHS)

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

Multi-Asset●Global

https://www

HSBC

7May2026

8

13.Marketpricinghasturnedsignificantlymorehawkish,orlessdovish,sincethestartoftheMiddleEastconflict

BRL

ZAR

GBP

EUR

PLN

CZK

CAD

HUF

USD

KRW

AUD

MXN

INR

CHF

THB

TWD

JPY

MYR

COP

Changeinyear-endratepricingsinceend-Feb(bp):DMEM

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

14.OurglobalpolicyratediffusionindexhasturnedpositiveforthefirsttimesinceAugust2023,suggestingwearealreadyseeingatightermonetarypolicybackdrop

45%

30%

15%

0%

-15%

-30%

-45%

201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026

Globalpolicyratediffusionindex(%)Globalinflation(y-o-y%,RHS)

10

8

6

4

2

0

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg,LSEGDatastream

15.Lastyear’ssteepeninghasturnedtobearflatteninginDM…

60

45

30

15

0

-15

-30

-45

-60

-75

-90

Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-26

10Y2Yyieldspread:US(bp)Germany(bp)

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

16.…andEM,asmarketsconsiderahigherinflationenvironment

0

-20

-40

-60

-80

-100

-120

Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-2610Y2Yyieldspread:EM(bp)

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

Multi-Asset●.Global

https://www

HSBC

7May2026

9

Growthriskcouldbethe‘tradeafterthetrade’-straittraffictodictate

17.Marketsaretalkinglessaboutthegrowthriskscomparedtoinflation…

18.withthescaleofdownwardrevisionstoGDPforecastsmorelimited

Newsstorycount(z-score)

20%

4.4%

4.3%

4.2%

4.1%

4.0%

3.9%

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

ConsensusGDPgrowthforecasts(2026)

181920212223242526

lnflationRecession

Source:HSBC,Bloomberg

6

.

1.9%

1.8%

1.7%

1.6%

1.5%

1.4